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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the United States has been busy
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP") Agreement
with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These countries
include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
As Ronald Kirk, then-United States Trade Representative
("USTR"), declared when the negotiations began in Melbourne,
Australia:
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations offer a unique
opportunity to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional
pact. In line with the President's goal of supporting two
million additional American jobs through exports, a robust
Copyright @ 2014 Peter K Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law
and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. Earlier
versions of this Article were presented at the "Trade and Transparency in the Internet
Age" Conference at Yale Law School and "The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement:
Impact and Implications" Workshop at the Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, and as a public lecture at the School of Law at Xiamen University in China. The
Article also benefits from the insights provided by a briefing meeting with the
negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement during the 14th negotiating
round in Leesburg, Virginia. The Author is grateful to Sean Flynn, Margot Kaminski,
Lin Xiuqin, and Bryan Mercurio for their kind invitations and the other participants of
these events for valuable comments, suggestions, and helpful exchanges.
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TPP agreement would expand our exports to one of the
world's fastest-growing regions. Our team's aim is to achieve
the biggest economic benefits for the American people, and
these negotiators will be working to set a new standard for
21st century trade pacts.1
The TPP began as a quadrilateral agreement between
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore known
as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement,
or more commonly as the "P4" or "Pacific 4."2 As Meredith
Lewis recounted:
[The negotiations were initially] launched by Chile, New
Zealand and Singapore at the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum] leaders' summit in 2002. These
original negotiations contemplated an agreement amongst
the three participating countries, to be known as the Pacific
Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3 CEP). However,
Brunei attended a number of rounds as an observer, and
ultimately joined the Agreement as a 'founding member'.
The Agreement was signed by New Zealand, Chile and
Singapore on July 18, 2005 and by Brunei on August 2,
2005, following the conclusion of negotiations in June
2005.3
In March 2010, the TPP negotiations began among Australia,
Peru, Vietnam, the United States, and the P4 members for an
expanded agreement.4 Since then, Malaysia, Canada, Mexico,
and Japan have joined the negotiations.5

1. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR], USTR Begins
TPP Talks in Australia (Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-office/press-releases/2010/march/ustr-begins-tpp-talks-australia
[hereinafter
TPP Launch Press Release].
2. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Brunei-Chile-N.Z.Sing.,July 18, 2005, 2592 U.N.T.S. 225.
3. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader TransPacific Partnership:Implications, Risks and Opportunities,4 ASIANJ. WTO & INT'L HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 401, 403-04 (2009).
4. TPP Launch Press Release, supra note 1.
5. Press Release, Office of the USTR, Statement of the Ministers and Heads of
Delegation for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries (Feb. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/February/Statementof-Ministers-and-Heads-of-Delegation-for-TPP-countries.

2014]

TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES

1131

Although it remains unclear which of the nearly thirty
chapters 6-or, more importantly, which specific provisions in
those chapters-will be included in the final text of the TPP
Agreement, the negotiations have been quite controversial. In
addition to the usual concerns about having high standards that
are heavily lobbied by industries and arguably inappropriate for
many participating countries, the TPP negotiations have been
heavily criticized for their secrecy and lack of transparency,
accountability, and democratic participation. The draft text of
the TPP intellectual property chapter, for example, was hitherto
available only through WikiLeaks. 8 Since then, the TPP chapter
on environmental standards has also been publicly leaked. 9
This Article does not seek to continue this line of criticism,
although
transparency,
accountability,
and
democratic
participation remain highly important. Nor does the Article aim
to explore the agreement's implications for each specific trade
sector, which have already received book-length treatments. 10
Instead, this Article focuses on the ramifications of the exclusion
of four different parties or groups of parties from the TPP
negotiations: (1) China; (2) BRICS and other emerging
economies; (3) Europe (including members of the European
Union and other countries in the region such as Switzerland);

6. Deborah Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Negotiations: Some
OutstandingIssues for the Final Stretch, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379,
384 (2013) [hereinafter Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations].
7. See, e.g., Letter from Prof. David S. Levine et al. to Ron Kirk, USTR (May 9,
2012), available at http://infojustice.org/archives/21137. In the interest of full
disclosure, the Author has signed on to this letter.
8. James Love, KEIAnalysis of Wikileaks Leak of TPPIPR Text, from August 30, 2013,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Nov. 13, 2013), http://keionline.org/node/1825.
9. Wikileaks Releases TPP Environmental Chapter; Once Again Shows M y Negotiators
Wanted Details Hidden, TECHDIRT (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140115/07432625883/wikileaks-releases-tpp-environmental-chapter-onceagain-shows-why-negotiators-wanted-details-hidden.shtml.
10. See, e.g., No ORDINARY DEAL: UNMASKING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Jane Kelsey ed., 2010) [hereinafter No ORDINARY DEAL];
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2012);
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Tania Voon ed., 2014) [hereinafter TRADE
LIBERALISATION
AND
INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION];
THE
TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (C.L. Lim et

al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP].
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and (4) civil society organizations. Targeting these "TPP
outsiders" and using illustrations from the intellectual property
sector and the larger trade context, 11 this Article seeks to
highlight the perplexities created by the TPP negotiations. It
cautions policymakers, commentators, and the public at large
against the negotiations' considerable and largely overlooked
costs.
I. CHINA
As far as "TPP outsiders" are concerned, the first country
that comes to mind is China. The exclusion of this country has
raised a wide array of questions: Should the TPP be used to serve
not only economic goals but also noneconomic goals? What role
would the exclusion of China play in the TPP negotiations?
Would all negotiating parties be better off with such exclusion?
Or would such exclusion make the regional pact less valuable
and less sustainable in the long run? If so, should the TPP
negotiating parties bring China into the fold to provide
additional trade benefits? Would the inclusion of the country
create an additional threat to the weaker negotiating parties? Or
would such inclusion help them resist the demands of the
United States,Japan, and other major trading powers?12
When the TPP is criticized for being used to isolate or
contain China, two rebuttals are usually offered. The first one,
which is rather defensive, points out that, even though the TPP
negotiations have excluded China, the negotiating parties have
actively engaged the country in other fora at both the
multilateral and nonmultilateral levels. Consider, for example,
11. Intellectual property remains one of the more sensitive areas in the TPP
negotiations, along with sugar, dairy, and textiles. See Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations,
supra note 6, at 384.
12. Simon Tay noted China's importance to its Asian neighbors:
[W] hile many talk about Asians rebalancing their economy to focus more on
regional and domestic consumption rather than depending on the American
consumer, the first alternative market they usually look to is that of China. If
China keeps growing over the medium to longer run, this will help not only
its own people but many more across Asia, and attract more and more of
them to China.
SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS DIVIDE FROM AMERICA 49

(2010).
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the United States' engagement with China. Since 2006, the two
countries have engaged in the high-profile US-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue." For more than three decades, China
and the United States have also had regular meetings through
the US-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT), which "was established in 1983 as a forum for high-level
dialogue on bilateral trade issues and a vehicle for promoting
commercial relations." 14
Although this rebuttal effectively denies the existence of an
overarching US foreign policy toward isolating or containing
China, it speaks very little to the motives behind the TPP
negotiations. Given China's current position as the world's
second largest economy, it is virtually impossible to imagine the
United States and other TPP negotiating parties not having any
active and continuous engagement with the country. Such
engagement is also badly needed in sensitive noneconomic
matters such as nuclear nonproliferation and peace-keeping
operations, not to mention China's veto power in the UN
Security Council.
Thus, the important question here is not whether other
international discussions are still being held between China and
the TPP negotiating parties. Those discussions will be held
regardless. Rather, the question should be why the TPP
negotiations have excluded China when countries are already
very eager to engage the country in international discussions.
More specifically, what are the motives behind such exclusion?
The second rebuttal suggests that the TPP's goals have been
misunderstood by many, including those in China. As this
counterargument goes, the plan of the TPP is not to isolate or

13. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was originally established by
the Bush administration in 2006 as the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. See
JOHN NAISBITT & DORIS NAISBITT, CHINA'S MEGATRENDS: THE 8 PILLARS OF A NEW
SOCIETY 157 (2010); see also Bonnie S. Glaser, The Diplomatic Relationship:Substance and
Process, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 151, 158-61 (David
Shambaugh ed., 2012) [hereinafter TANGLED TITANS] (discussing the US-China

Strategic and Economic Dialogue).
14. US-Chinajoint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), INT'L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/JCCTforweb.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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contain the country, but rather to integrate it to the larger
international economy.15

At the moment, China does not possess the necessary
conditions to be further integrated 16 into what the USTR
referred to as "a high-standard, 21st-century
[trade]
agreement." 17 As a result, the existing negotiating parties, many
of which have similar economic, social, and technological
conditions, have to negotiate first. The plan, however, is to add
China and other countries at a later point in time when they
become ready. Even if China eventually decides not to join the
regional pact, a "TPP first, China later" process would still

15 . See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks at Singapore
Management University (Nov. 17, 2012), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/
st/english/texttrans/2012/11/20121117138825.html ("We welcome the interest of any
nation willing to meet 21st century standards as embodied in the TPP, including
China."); see also SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58 ("We see little evidence to support
the notion that China is being excluded as part of a broader containment strategy.");
Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, The TPP-MultilateralizingRegionalism or the Securitization
of Trade Policy, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 279, 293 (noting the
risk of the "TPP becom [ing] hostage to perceptions that it is part of a US foreign policy
strategy to contain China"). As Jeffrey Schott, Barbara Kotschwar, and Julia Muir
observed:
The containment thesis falls flat for several reasons. First, and most obviously,
a trade agreement simply cannot "contain" a large country, either
economically or politically. Second, US officials need a cooperative China to
confront the myriad problems facing the world economy and the security
challenges posed by Iran and North Korea as new and aspiring nuclear
nations in Asia. The United States and China need to work together and
therefore must manage the inevitable frictions that arise as the breadth and
scope of their commercial relations expand. Third, no one else in Asia wants
to contain China either. The trade and investment integration in the AsiaPacific region achieved over the past few decades benefits all the TPP
participants, even as it poses competitiveness challenges for their
manufacturing industries. The proper response is to use trade arrangements,
in conjunction with domestic economic reforms, to boost productivity of local
industry and thereby be better positioned to compete against Chinese firms at
home and abroad.
SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58.
16. See SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 58 (noting that "China is not ready to
implement and enforce the types of obligations under construction in the TPP
negotiations").
17. Press Release, Office of the USTR, USTR Statement Regarding the TransPacific Partnership Negotiations (Sept. 5, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011 /september/ustr-statement-regarding-transpacific-partnersh.
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benefit the United States and other negotiating parties. As
President Barack Obama recently acknowledged, "if we can get a
trade deal with all the other countries in Asia that says you've got
to protect people's intellectual property[,] that will help us in
our negotiations with China."1 8
Moreover, it is not unusual for like-minded countries to
band together to develop higher trade standards. To be certain,
commentators
have
widely
criticized
the
increased
fragmentation of the international trading system brought about
by bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements. 19 For
example, Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), noted that "proliferation is breeding
concern-concern about incoherence, confusion, exponential
increase of costs for business, unpredictability and even
unfairness in trade relations."2 0 Likewise, Francis Gurry, the
then-Director General of the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"), lamented how the negotiating parties
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA") 21 had
"tak[en] matters into their own hands to seek solutions outside
of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of
the present system." 22

18. President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/08/press-conference-president
(Oct. 8, 2013); see also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 292 ("Obama identified
the TPP as a 'potential model' for the entire region, thus melding together US business
interests and foreign policy interests to put pressure on China and others.").
19. See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596600 (2007) (discussing the growing "proliferation of international regulatory
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries"); Peter K Yu,
International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 13-21 [hereinafter Yu, International Enclosure] (discussing the
development of the "international intellectual property regime complex").
20. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Opening Remarks at the
Conference on "Multilateralizing Regionalism" in Geneva (Sept. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl e/sppl6 7 e.htm.
21. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50
I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
22. Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in MultilateralSystem, WIPO Head Says,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/.
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Nevertheless, the establishment of bilateral, plurilateral,
and regional trade agreements can result in more harmonized
standards if these agreements are eventually consolidated into
what commentators once described as "TRIPS II" 2 3-referring
to a potential major revision of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 24 ("TRIPS Agreement").
In the TPP context, greater harmonization can also occur if
Asia-Pacific regionalism is eventually multilateralized. 25
In general, nonmultilateral agreements are likely to be
consolidated if they provide enough incentives for outsiders to
join at later stages. As Ruth Okediji pointed out, countries may
seek to "consolidate and (perhaps improve) the gains from
bilateralism" once they have developed a "network of bilateral
agreements [that] is sufficiently dense" for that purpose. 26 Cho
Sungjoon concurred: "[R]egionalism may contribute to
multilateralism under certain circumstances through a
'laboratory effect'. After experiencing trial and error as well as
learning-by-doing in the regional level, countries may feel
confident in ratcheting these regional initiatives up to the
multilateral forum. "27
The negotiation of many key international agreements, in
fact, began with mini-negotiations among a small group of key,
and often likeminded, players before the negotiations were
finally extended to other members of the international
community. A case in point is the negotiation of the TRIPS
Agreement, which began with trilateral discussions among the

23. See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND

ANALYSIS 48 (2d ed. 2003); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The InternationalIntellectual Property
Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 213,
217 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 21, 21 (2004).
24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
25. See Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 280 (noting "the multilateralization
of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific").
26. Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual PropertyProtection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH.J. 125, 143 (2004).
27. Cho Sungjoon, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference
in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 238 (2004).
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European Communities, Japan, and the United States. 28
Another good, but much earlier, example is the establishment
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property 29 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works.3 0 As Bryan Mercurio recounted in
regard to these two cornerstone agreements:
By the mid-1800s, . . . trading nations

had created

a

complex web of agreements in which [most-favoured-nation
and national treatments] applied bilaterally. When the
"spaghetti bowl" agreements became unmanageable,
practitioners and government[s] realized the rights needed
to be formally adopted in an international framework. Such
efforts built upon the bilateralism by filling gaps and
providing coherence to [intellectual property rights]. This
process culminated in the Paris Convention . . . and the
Berne Convention . . . .

To a great extent, bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade
agreements have been used as "building blocks." For example,

OF

28. See generally SUSAN K SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96-120 (2003)
(recounting the trilateral

discussions among the United States, the European Union, and Japan).
29. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at StockholmJuly 14, 1967).
30. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app., Sept.
9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at ParisJuly 24, 1971).
31. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 217 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2007). Jagdish Bhagwati coined the term "spaghetti bowl." Jagdish
Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS
DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne 0.
Krueger eds., 1995). This term refers to "a mish-mash of overlapping, supporting, and
possibly conflicting, obligations." Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (Simon Lester &

Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) [hereinafter BRTA CASE STUDIES]. In the Asian context,
the Asian Development Bank and other commentators have used the term "noodle
bowl" instead. Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Free Trade
Agreement, in BRTA CASE STUDIES, supra, at 192, 224 [hereinafter Wang, ACFTA]; Peter
K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 978 (2011); Richard E.
Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism (Asian Dev.
Bank, Working Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP07Baldwin.pdf; Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian TAs: Trends and Challenges
3 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 144, 2009), available at http://www.adb.org/
documents/Working-Papers/2010/Economics-WP226.pdf.
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Jason Kearns found the United States-Morocco Free Trade
Agreement reflecting "a 'building block' approach: first
ensuring that countries accede to the WTO, then negotiating
trade and investment agreements with individual countries in
the region (such as the Agreement with Morocco), and finally
reaching a comprehensive United States-Middle East Free
Trade Area."32 The TPP can also be seen "as a building block
towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific [FTAAP] " 3 3-a
concept APEC studied in 2006 and an agreement it pledged to
create in 2009.34 If created, the FTAAP is likely to provide
considerable trade and nontrade benefits to both the AsiaPacific region and the global economy.3 5

32. Jason Kearns, United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in BRTA CASE
STUDIES, supra note 31, at 144, 146; see also Chia Siow Yue & Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN
Perspective on PromotingRegional and GlobalFreer Trade, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASLA-PACIFIC 190, 198 (Charles E

Morrison & Eduardo Pedrosa eds., 2007) [hereinafter AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?]
("The Singapore government views FTAs as building blocks towards global and APEC
freer trade. Formation of bilateral FTAs among like-minded partners is seen as a way to
avoid the problem in which the pace of trade liberalization is held back
unnecessarily.").
33. JeffreyJ. Schott & Julia Muir, US PTAs: Mat's Been Done and What It Means for
the TPP Negotiations, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 45, 61. Meredith
Lewis recounted the origin of the FTAAP:
In 1994, the APEC membership held its annual meeting in Bogor, Indonesia
and adopted the Bogor Goals, which included the objective of achieving free
and open trade and investment amongst developed APEC members by 2010,
and developing country members by 2020. Although this Bogor Goal has yet
to be fully realized, APEC has continued to strive towards this objective. And
consistent with the desire for free trade within APEC, in 2006 APEC
announced a study into the prospect of a [FTAAP], with later
pronouncements endorsing an FTAAP as a goal.
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths Toward
Deeper Asian Economic Integration, 8 ASIANJ. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359, 362
(2013) [hereinafter Lewis, TPP and RCEP]. For an excellent collection of articles
discussing the APEC trade agenda and the development of the FTAAP, see generally
AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32.
34. See Merdith Kolsky Lewis, Achieving a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific: Does the
TPP Present the Most Attractive Path?, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at
223, 223 [hereinafter Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP].
35. According to Fred Bergsten, the FTAAP could provide "the best, or perhaps
only, way" to:
* catalyse a substantively successful Doha Round;
* offer an alternative "Plan B" to restore the momentum of liberalization if
Doha does falter badly:
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Thus, if the TPP's ultimate goal is to develop a treaty that
requires higher standards than what the WTO currently
requires, it makes sense to exclude China from the negotiations.
To begin with, China continues to struggle with a wide variety of
internal problems despite having joined the international
trading body in December 2001.36 To date, these problems have
included "decreasing control by the state, decentralization of
the central government, significant losses suffered by inefficient
state-owned enterprises, the widening gap between the rich and
the poor and between the urban and rural areas, massive urban
migration, widespread unemployment, corruption, and growing
unrest in both the cities and the countryside." Given the scale
and persistence of these problems, it is no surprise that China
thus far has kept a rather low profile in the WTO-or for that
matter other intergovernmental organizations.3 8 As Henry Gao
explained:

* prevent a further, possibly explosive, proliferation of bilateral and subregional PTAs that create substantial new discrimination and discord
within the Asia-Pacific region;
* avoid renewed risk of "drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific" as
East Asian, and perhaps Western Hemisphere, regional initiatives that
APEC was created to foster;
* channel the China-U.S. economic conflict into a more constructive and less
confrontational context that could defuse at least some of its attendant
tension and risk; and
* revitalize APEC itself, which is now of enhanced importance because of the
risks of Asia-Pacific and especially China-U.S. fissures.
C. Fred Bergsten, A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific in the Wake of the FalteringDoha
Round: Trade Policy AlternativesforAPEC, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32, at
15, 32-33.
36. For a timely collection of articles discussing China's performance in its first
decade in the WTO, see generally CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: CHINA'S
FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds., 2013).

37. Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1, 3 (2003) (remarks of the Author).
38. See Henry S. Gao, China's Participationin the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective, 11
SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 41, 69 (2007) [hereinafter Gao, China's Participationin the WTO]
("Be it in the informal green room meetings, the formal meetings of the various
committees and councils or the grand sessions of the Ministerial Conferences, China
has generally been reticent."); Peter K Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual
Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT'L L. 209, 229-37 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Middle
Kingdom] (discussing China's low profile in the international intellectual property
arena).
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As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake
a lot of commitments, many of which are more onerous
than those of existing WTO members. It is already a
humongous challenge for China to try to implement these
commitments. After having been in the spotlight for fifteen
years, what China needs now is some quiet breathing space.
Shouldering a leadership role would put China back on the
front stage again and encourage other Members to pressure
China to make more concessions. 39
Moreover, the experience in the Doha Development Round
of Trade Negotiations ("Doha Round") has shown that China is
unlikely to quickly support standards that exceed what the WTO
presently requires. 40 China has also been the respondent in a
growing number of WTO complaints, on issues ranging from
intellectual property enforcement to duties on steel products to
exports of rare earths. 41 Thus, if including China in the TPP
negotiations would slow down the discussions or create
deadlocks similar to what the Doha Round now experiences, it
makes great strategic sense to exclude China from the
negotiations-or, at least, from the initial stages of these
negotiations.
Such exclusion is particularly important, considering the
significant leverage China can derive from its economic strength
and vast market. It is also badly needed considering that the

39. Gao, China'sParticipationin the WTO, supra note 38, at 70.
40. See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting
248-63, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010)
(reporting China's criticism of the TRIPS-plus enforcement standards established by
ACTA and other bilateral and regional trade agreements); Tu Xinquan, China'sPosition
and Role in the Doha Round Negotiations, in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE:
CHINA'S FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 36 at 167
(noting that "some Members and observers claim that China is the root cause of the
WTO's Doha fiasco"); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles'Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
479, 514-15 (2011) (recounting China's strong opposition to enforcement-related
discussions at the TRIPS Council).
41 . Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); Panel Report, ChinaCountervailingand Anti-DumpingDuties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled ElectricalSteelfrom the
United States, WT/DS414/R (June 15, 2012); Appellate Body Report, ChinaCountervailingand Anti-DumpingDuties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled ElectricalSteelfrom the
United States, WT/DS414/AB/R (Oct. 18, 2012); Panel Report, China-MeasuresRelated
to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenu, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R,
WT /DS433 /R (Mar. 26. 2014).

2014]

TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES

1141

United States and other developed and like-minded countries
are now in need of an alternative international forum. As Mitsuo
Matsushita, a former member of the WTO Appellate Body,
reminded us, "the power relationship in the WTO has changed,
that is, the majority of WTO members today are developing
countries and they have been successful in rallying their forces
to act as countervailing powers vis-d-vis the hegemony of
developed-country Members, such as the United States and the
European Union." 42
Although good policy arguments exist to support the
exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations, especially when
the focus is on the short term, such exclusion is likely to
significantly curtail the agreement's long-term regional impact.
In fact, if the TPP negotiating parties had made a conscious and
determined choice to exclude China from the negotiations, it is
unclear how they could now induce China to join the regional
pact. 43 As I noted in earlier articles in the context of ACTA,
another plurilateral agreement set up with the ill-advised
"country club" approach, 44 it is instructive to compare joining
that agreement with joining the WTO, a multilateral trade club
to which China acceded more than a decade ago.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, China was very eager to join
the WTO and accede to the TRIPS Agreement, even though it
had to revamp a wide array of laws and regulations and agree to
high WTO-plus standards. 45 As Samuel Kim observed at that
42. Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese Policies Toward East Asian Free Trade Agreements:
Policy and Legal Perspectives, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF
BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 41, 42 (Ross Buckley et al. eds.,
2008) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE].

43. But cf. Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 372-74 (discussing China's
statement of interest in regard to the TPP).
44. For discussions of this approach, see Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism,
Blogs and Innovation: The Future of InternationalIntellectual Property Norm Making in the
Wake ofACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 323
(Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); Peter K Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed.,
2014).
45. See Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A
REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary
Foot eds., 2004) ("In a few important areas, China assumed obligations that exceed
normal WTO standards-the so-called WTO-plus commitments."); Julia Ya Qin, China,
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time, China was willing "to gain WTO entry at almost any
price." 46 The country's approach was understandable. To many
Chinese leaders, the WTO membership helped secure China's
rightful place in the international community. Even if the
economic costs were high, the symbolic value of the WTO
accession and an improved standing in the international
community would more than compensate for the accession's
short-term costs.
The TPP, however, is not the WTO. It does not give China a
rightful place in the international community. Nor does TPP
club membership have any bearing on China's dignitary
interests. To be certain, not being allowed to join the TPP could
cause China to lose face, international reputation, or even soft
power. 47 Nevertheless, whether the exclusion would achieve this
outcome will depend on whether the TPP is seen as a fair and
legitimate trade pact. If most countries and members of the
public consider the TPP an illegitimate attempt to bully the less
powerful countries into adopting inappropriate standards, the
exclusion of China from the negotiations will have a very limited
impact on its dignitary interests, international reputation, and
soft power.
Moreover, inclusion in the TPP negotiations does not
indicate that the possession of high trade standards. Consider,
for example, the intellectual property standards in the TPP
Agreement. Although it would be highly unattractive for China
to be branded as a pirate nation, especially after undertaking so
India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 167,

173-75 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (outlining
China's "'WTO-plus' rules"); Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 38, at 224 ("As part of its
entry price, China took on not only obligations under the TRIPS Agreement but also
additional WTO-plus commitments.").
46. Kim, supra note 45, at 49.
47. As Derek Mitchell observed:
[I] nternational condemnation of China's domestic record on human rights,
rule of law, political freedom, corruption, and export product safety has
infuriated Beijing. This is true not only because of traditional Asian notions
of "losing face" or contentions that it "hurts the feelings of 1.3 billion
Chinese people," as the Chinese are wont to say, but also because these
public criticisms affect China's international reputation and thus its soft
power.
C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL.. CHINA'S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 216 (2008).

2014]

TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES

1143

many legal reforms and enforcement campaigns in the past two
decades, 48 TPP membership is not limited to countries that have
always respected intellectual property rights. The checkered
pasts of Japan and the United States speak for themselves. 49
More importantly, as the USTR declared in his latest Section 301
Report, close to half of the twelve TPP negotiating parties failed
to adequately protect intellectual property rights. While Chile
earned the distinction of being on the Priority Watch List,
Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam were all on the Watch List.50
Malaysia was only removed from the Watch List in 2012,51 more
than a year after the country joined the TPP negotiations.5 2
Thus, even under the USTR's unilateral standards, the TPP
country club is a den filled with known pirates.
While it is already highly challenging for the TPP
negotiating parties to induce China to participate in the
negotiations or join the agreement after its formation, the preconditions attached to joining the negotiations or the
agreement have become even more problematic. Most of the
present negotiating parties simply do not see the agreement as
48. For the Author's earlier discussions of the Chinese intellectual property
system, see generally Peter K, Yu, From Piratesto Partners:ProtectingIntellectualProperty in
China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
to Partners(Episode II): ProtectingIntellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
901 (2006); Peter K, Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Yu,
Middle Kingdom, supra note 38.
49. As William Kingston noted:
From the start of the industrial revolution, every country that became
economically great began by copying: the Germans copied the British; the
Americans copied the British and the Germans, and the Japanese copied
everybody. The trust of the TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that this process of
growth by copying and learning by doing will never happen again.
William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTYREGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus &Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Peter
K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its UndeterminedFuture, 1 WIPO J. 1, 1213 (2009) (discussing the United States' past as a pirate nation).
50. OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 2-3 (2013).
51. See OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 8 (2012).
52. Press Release, Ministry of Int'l Trade & Indus. (Malay.), Malaysia Joins TPP
Agreement Negotiations (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/
contentjsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article 8b253a38-cOa81573-f5aOf5aO-d9375f5b.
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an open pact that Asia-Pacific countries can freely join at any
stage and under any condition.5 3 For example, when Canada,
Mexico, and Japan requested to join the negotiations, they had
to agree not to renegotiate chapters that have already achieved
consensus among the preexisting negotiating parties.54 While
53. As Deborah Elms and Lim Chin Leng observed:
Although the TPP is being designed to allow other states to join, the entire
Agreement cannot be renegotiated for each new member. At a certain point,
the Agreement will have to be closed for new membership-after that,
economies could still elect to accede, but they would have to accept the deal
on the table as given

(subject, presumably, to minor modifications and

certain conditions for entry).
Deborah K Elms & C.L. Lim, An Overview and Snapshot of the TPP Negotiations, in TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 21, 41-42. But see C.L. Lim et al., Mhat Is "HighQuality, Twenty-First Century "Anyway?, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at
3, 3 [hereinafter Lim et al., "High-Quality, Twenty-First Century'] ("[The TPP] is an
open-ended agreement that clearly contemplates an expanded membership over
time."). To a large extent, one can contrast the TPP with the original P4, which "ha[d]
an open accession clause [and] encourage [d] other economies to negotiate to accede
to the agreement." Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 223, 225; see also C.L.
Lim, The China-ASEAN Tariff Acceleration Clause, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 427, 439-41

(discussing open

regionalism); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian Regionalism, in CHINA,
INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 333, 374-75

[hereinafter Wang, Role of China and India] (discussing how China and India should
lead Asia to practice open regionalism with an Asian identity).
54. As Inside U.S. Trade reported, Mexico had to accept the following conditions
in order to join the TPP negotiations:
First, Mexico agreed to accept all text on which the nine current TPP
partners have already reached consensus. That consensus text cannot be
reopened unless the nine current TPP partners agreed to revisit it, one
official explained.
In addition, Mexico agreed to accept all future text on which the nine
partners reach consensus during the forthcoming 90-day window. This
appears to reflect the idea forwarded by some TPP observers earlier this week
that new entrants like Mexico will not have "veto authority" over the closing
of some future TPP chapters.
Mexico did not have a chance to review the past consensus text that it
agreed to accept as a condition of entry. Its current understanding is that it
also will not have access to any texts until it formally enters the talks, meaning
that it will also have to agree to text to which TPP partners agree during the
90-day period without getting to review it first.
Mexico Stresses It Will Be a Full TPP Partner,Despite Terms of Entry, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
June 22, 2012. In regard to Canada, Michael Geist wrote:
1. According to Inside US Trade, the U.S. established two conditions for
Canadian entry. First, Canada will not be able to reopen any chapters where
agreement has already been reached among the current nine TPP partners.
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agreeing to such terms would literally place the late-arriving
countries as "second class citizens," this lower status would not
matter much substantively when most chapters have not yet
achieved consensus.5 5
For countries joining the agreement after its formation,
however, the impact of being second-class TPP citizens-and
therefore not having the ability to renegotiate chapters or
provisions with which they disagree-would be quite significant.
Given China's now considerable economic power and
geopolitical leverage, it is indeed difficult to see why China-or,
for that matter, other large developing countries like Indiawould join an agreement that is filled with rules and standards
that it had no role in shaping and that it cannot re-negotiate.56
Gone are the days where trade rules could be created in the
developed world and then shoved down the throats of large
developing countries. If China is to eventually become a party to
the TPP, the negotiating parties will have to make significant
adjustments to induce the country tojoin.
The problem with this is that Canada has agreed to this condition without
actually gaining access to the current TPP text. Has Canada agreed to be
bound by terms it has not even read? Can it disclose what it has effectively
agreed to simply by accepting the offer to enter the negotiations?
2. Inside US Trade also reports that Canada has second tier status in the
negotiations as the U.S. has stipulated that Canada would not have "veto
authority" over any chapter. This means that should the other nine countries
agree on terms, Canada would be required to accept them. Has Canada
agreed to this condition? How will it deal with the prospect that the other
nine countries agree to terms that are disadvantageous to Canada?
Michael Geist, 2nd Tier Status for Canada?:5 Questions on Canada's Entry to the Trans
Pacific Partnership Talks (June 19, 2012), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/
6547/125; accord Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 372 ("Getting approval
to participate did not mean . . . that Japan automatically became eligible to see all the
negotiating texts or to sit in on bargaining at the next round of discussions. Instead,
Japan was forced to wait for the domestic procedures in each TPP member country to
be completed before it was allowed to commence discussions with any of them."); see
also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 290 ("US Trade Representative declared that
'potential new entrants must be prepared to address a range of US priorities and
issues'.").
55. See SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 41 (noting that Canada and Mexico's
commitments not to reopen the already "agreed" text is "not an onerous requirement
since much of what has been completed involves relatively less controversial issues").
56. Cf. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975,
1090-91 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (advancing a similar claim in relation
to ACTA).
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Moreover, some of the TPP standards, if adopted as
reported, would present major challenges to China. A case in
point is the proposed government procurement standards,
which would drastically alter the structure and operation of
state-owned enterprises. As Professor Gao rightly observed:
[I]f China were to join the TPP Agreement one day, it
w[ould] have to comply with the discipline on state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which have already become a hot issue
in the current negotiations. However, as SOEs are of great
political as well as economic significance in China, it would
be impossible for China to accede to such demands.5 7
The TPP's electronic commerce standards could also deeply
affect China's censorship and information control policy.5 8 This
issue has become especially sensitive in the trade context
following China's losses before both the WTO panel and the
Appellate Body in China-MeasuresAffecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
EntertainmentProducts.59
To complicate matters even further, some negotiating
parties simply do not see the TPP solely as a trade pact. Instead,
they consider it as an important alliance that helps foster
regional security.60 Some may have gone even further to view the
57. Henry Gao, From the P4 to the TPP Transplantationor Transformation, in TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 64, 79 [hereinafter Gao, From the P4 to the TPP];
see also Ted Murphy, Government Procurement and Labour Issues, in No ORDINARY DEAL,
supra note 10, at 189, 190-95 (discussing the government procurement standards in the
TPP Agreement).
58. See Gao, From the P4 to the TPP, supra note 57, at 79-80 (" [R]equests for China
to remove barriers on e-commerce will meet major resistance from the internet
censorship regime of China.").
59. Panel Report, China-MeasuresAffecting TradingRights and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12,
2009); Appellate Body Report, China-MeasuresAffecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Servicesfor Certain Publicationsand Audiovisual EntertainmentProducts,WT/DS363/AB/R
(Dec. 21, 2009).
60. See Paul G. Buchanan, Security Implications of the TPPA, in No ORDINARY DEAL,
supra note 10, at 82, 87 ("The strategic context in which the proposed TPPA [TransPacific Partnership Agreement] is being negotiated is one where the People's Republic
of China is gradually challenging US military and economic primacy in the Western
Pacific amid a general military build-up throughout the region."); Capling & Ravenhill,
supra note 15, at 292 ("The 'securitization' of the TPP is consistent with a recent trend
in US trade policy to use PTAs to reinforce strategic relationships. This development
can be dated to the Israel-US free trade agreement of 1985, but it gained momentum
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TPP as a strategic tool to ward off the threat created by a rapidlyemerging China, 61 or the so-called "China threat." 62 It is
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the Bush administration initiated a
series of [preferential trade agreement] negotiations with countries that were of
strategic or geopolitical importance to the United States."); Olivier Cattaneo, The
Political Economy

of PTAs,

in

BILATERAL

AND

REGIONAL

TRADE AGREEMENTS:

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 42-50 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009)
[hereinafter BRTA COMMENTARY] (discussing how bilateral and regional agreements
are instruments of foreign policy that are primarily driven by political considerations);
Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 39 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino
eds., 2007) (" [M] any states enter into RTAs [regional trade agreements] for important
political, rather than exclusively economic, considerations. In short, states are using
economic means for political ends."); see also Kearns, supra note 32, at 145 ("Morocco
and the US agreed to negotiate an agreement just eight months after the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. The US was looking to strengthen its relationship with a
reform-minded Muslim nation in the Middle East-and to provide economic
opportunities in that region as a way to counter terrorism."); Andrew D. Mitchell &
Tania Voon, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, in BRTA CASE STUDIES, supra
note 31, at 6, 8 ("An unofficial suggestion is that the AUSFTA was 'payback' for
Australia's support of the Iraq war: September 11 may have been what finally led the
US to agree to the AUSFTA." (footnote omitted)).
61. As Paul Buchanan observed:
[F] or the US, the TPPA has strategic implications beyond trade per se. The
TPPA would provide the US with a trade-based counterbalance to Chinese
ambitions as well as a means by which to redress the current soft power
imbalance that favours the Chinese in the South Western Pacific. Beyond any
material benefits that accrued, the establishment of a US-led eight-country
[now twelve-country] trading bloc across the Pacific Rim, with potential to
expand to other APEC members, would help offset Chinese 'chequebook
diplomacy' as a form of influence and leverage in that part of the world.
Buchanan, supra note 60, at 89; see also Avery Goldstein, U.S. -ChinaInteractions in Asia,
in TANGLED TITANS, supra note 13, at 263, 281 (" [W]hen American support for
realizing the TPP was given a high priority two years later in conjunction with the
November 2011 [APEC] meeting in Honolulu, the prominence accorded the initiative
was widely viewed as having a new political significance related to the turbulence in the
U.S.-China relations during the years following Obama's 2009 trip to China."); Lewis,
Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 (recalling the speech of the chair of the House
Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee that "the TPP 'at least begins the process of
positioning the US as a counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific Region"'); Jagdish
Bhagwati, Deadlock in Durban, PROJECT-SYNDICATE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deadlock-in-durban
(stating that TPP "will
principally aid countries that are worried about an aggressive China and seek political
security rather than increase trade").
Nevertheless, some countries remain wary about such a strategic approach,
especially vis-a-vis China. As Ann Capling and John Ravenhill recounted:
In November, it was reported that Australia and New Zealand: "have had to
communicate to key figures supporting the TPP [in Washington] in no
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therefore understandable why some TPP negotiating parties
would have second thoughts about admitting China into the
regional pact.
When all of these factors are taken together, it is no
surprise that China remains outside the TPP and will likely
continue to be so in the near future. Nevertheless, its outsider
status is likely to create problems not only for the TPP, but also
more broadly for the Asia-Pacific region and the global
economy. To begin with, many commentators believe that the
TPP needs to include China if it is to have long-term regional
success. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low
observed:
If the ultimate goal of the TPP is to expand to the FTAAP,
then the TPP will have to include China. If the TPP is
serious about expanding trade cooperation in the AsiaPacific, then the TPP ought to include China at some point
in the future. This is not to say that China needs to
participate in the negotiations at this initial stage. But it is to
suggest that China's involvement should be planned for and
that steps should be taken to make it more-and not lesslikely that China willjoin in the future.6 3
At the regional and multilateral levels, excluding China
from the TPP negotiations could also have serious implications
for both trade and regulation. As Avery Goldstein observed:

uncertain terms that the moment New Zealand and Australia smell a China
containment policy, they are 'gone' from the negotiations". Such views are
likely to be shared by other TPP members that have important trade,
investment and political relationships with China, and who do not want these
to be held hostage to US foreign policy concerns.
Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 293.
62. For discussions of the so-called China threat, see generally CHINA'S FUTURE:
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted Galen Carpenter & James A.
Dorn eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
TARGETS AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA'S PLAN TO DOMINATE
ASIA AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY
WILL BE FOUGHT AND How THEY CAN BE WON (2007).
63. C.L. Lim et al., Conclusion, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at
319, 325; see SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 55 ("It is hard to conceive of a
comprehensive Asia-Pacific trade arrangement that does not eventually include
China."); Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 235 ("[I]t ... does not seem
realistic that in the long-term there will be an FTAAP that does not include China.").
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Suspicious of U.S. intentions, China might have been
expected to reconsider the usefulness of regional
organizations that, since the mid-1990s, it had seen as
venues for reassuring nervous neighbors. If they were
instead becoming settings in which others could gang up on
China or act as fronts for American efforts to check China's
rise (as Beijing had feared in the early 1990s), their appeal
would diminish. 64
To be certain, Chinese leaders, especially those nationalistic
ones, may consider it offensive for China to be left out of the
TPP negotiations. However, it is also plausible that they see the
exclusion as a blessing in disguise. Because China continues to
struggle with a wide variety of internal problems, its leaders may
not be convinced that the country is ready for further trade
liberalization under the TPP. Moreover, China has always taken
a strong sovereignty-based position that resists international
intervention in domestic affairs. 65 From this perspective alone,
the more the TPP negotiations weaken the existing multilateral
system, the stronger China's arguments against multilateral
intervention will be in the future.
Finally, China has been actively negotiating its own version
of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and investment
agreements just as the TPP is being developed. 66 Since the mid64. Goldstein, supra note 61, at 282.
65. See Adama Gaye, China in Africa: After the Gun and the Bible ... A West African
Perspective, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE

129, 138 (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA] ("'We
don't believe that human rights should be above sovereignty issues . . . .' (quoting He
Wenping, Director of Africa Department of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences));
Shalmali Guttal, Client and Competitor: China and InternationalFinancialInstitutions, in
CHINA'S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 17, 32
(Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA'S NEW ROLE]
("What China argues for is the sovereign rights of governments to shape their own
development strategies and to make decisions about projects and policies regardless of
social, environmental and governance implications."); Denis M. Tull, The Political
Consequences of China'sReturn to Africa, in CHINA RETURNS TOAFRICA, supra, at 111, 118
(noting that "unconditional respect for national sovereignty [that] makes any attempt
to interfere into the domestic affairs of a state illegitimate").
66. For discussions of these developments, see generally Henry Gao, The RTA
Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note

42, at 53; Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland
Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 (2010); Wang, Role of China and India,
supra note 53; Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31.
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2000s, China has successfully negotiated bilateral agreements
with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Costa Rica,
Iceland, and Switzerland, including four of the twelve TPP
negotiating parties.6 7 China is also negotiating a free trade
agreement with Australia. 68 In addition, China has developed
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area with Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and other members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).69 Included in many of these
agreements is an "Early Harvest Program," whose generous
trade terms have greatly improved China's regional reputation.7 0
It is therefore no surprise that Joshua Kurlantzick described
these programs as part of the country's "charm offensive."71
In November 2012, China, India, members of ASEAN, and
other key Asia-Pacific neighbors also launched the negotiation
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
("RCEP").72 Building on past trade and non-trade discussions
under the ASEAN+6 framework (Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea), this new regional partnership
will cover not only the two most powerful middle-income
countries in the Asia-Pacific region (China and India), but also
two advanced Asian economies (Japan and South Korea) as well
as seven of the TPP negotiating parties.73

67. The texts of the agreements are available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn.
68. See China-Australia FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/
topic/enaustralia.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (providing updates on the
negotiations).
69. For discussions of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, see Wang, ACFTA, supra
note 31, at 224; Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 1007-09.
70. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 996-97 (discussing these
programs).
71. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: How CHINA'S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD (2007); see also THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 34310, CHINA'S "SOFT POWER" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (2008) (discussing China's

growing use of soft power in Southeast Asia).
72. Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN and FTA Partners Launch the
World's Biggest Regional Free Trade Deal, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.asean.org/
news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-fta-partners-launch-the-world-s-biggestregional-free-trade-deal; see also Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 363-62
(discussing the RCEP).
73. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 227-29 (discussing possible
avenues for Asian economic integration, including ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and APEC); see
also MARK BEESON. REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA: POLITICS. SECURITY
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Thus, if China considers the TPP a foreign policy
instrument initiated by the United States and other like-minded
countries to isolate or contain the country, it may greatly
accelerate the development of these alternative regimes. This
scenario is not unforeseeable considering that many countries in
the Asia-Pacific region remain reluctant to pick between China
and the United States despite their concern about China's
growing economic and military strengths. As David Shambaugh
pointed out:
[H]aving to choose between Beijing and Washington as a
primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast
majority of Asian states . . . . It is not an exaggeration that

all Asian states seek to have sound, extensive, and
cooperative relations with both the United States and China,
and thus will do much to avoid being put into a bipolar
dilemma.7 4
In sum, the exclusion of China from the TPP negotiations
has raised questions regarding the agreement's benefits,
significance, and viability. The exclusion has also created
complications
and perplexities concerning the future
development of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and
investment agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region. For better or
worse, the TPP negotiations could initiate and accelerate the
development of a new set of nonmultilateral agreements that
further undermine the international regulatory environment
and multilateral trading system.
II. BRICS AND OTHER EMERGING COUNTRIES
The second group of "TPP outsiders" consists of fastgrowing, emerging middle-income economies in the Asia-Pacific

AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 232-36 (2007) [hereinafter BEESON, REGIONALISM AND
GLOBALIZATION] (discussing ASEAN+3).
74. David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia's New Dynamics, in
POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA'S NEW DYNAMICS 1, 17 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006)
[hereinafter POWER SHIFT]; accord Ellen L. Frost, China's Commercial Diplomacy in Asia:
Promise or Threat?, in CHINA'S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 95, 105
(William W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) (noting that Asian countries "do
not wish to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington").
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region, including the so-called BRICS countries.7 5 Coined in
2001 for a group of high-growth developing countries by Jim
O'Neill, Goldman Sachs's then-chief global economist, the term
"BRICs" initially referred to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.76
Since then, this rapidly popularized term has been generalized
to cover other emerging middle-income countries, including
South Africa 7 and what O'Neill and his associates have
described as "N-11" (Next 11) countries7 8 and later "growth
markets." 79
These fast-growing, emerging middle-income economies
are important because these countries are likely to provide the
most significant growth in the near future. As two Goldman
Sachs global economists noted in a study entitled Dreaming with
BRICs: The Path to 2050,80 the economies of Brazil, Russia, India,

75. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84

(Tom Ginsburg & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2014) (discussing intellectual property
developments in large middle-income economies).
76. See JIM O'NEILL, GOLDMAN SACHS, BUILDING BETTER GLOBAL ECONOMIC

BRICS (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 66, 2001), available at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-betterbrics.pdf.
77 . See, e.g., CHIDI OGUAMANAM,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: THE CRISIS OF EQUITY IN THE NEW KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 221-22 (2012)

(expanding the definition of the BRICS countries to cover other emerging middleincome economies); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines]
(expanding the BRICS acronym to cover South Africa); Sebastien Hervieu, South Africa
Gains Entry to BRIC Club, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Apr. 19, 2011, 9:04 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /apr/19/south-africa-joins-bric-club
(reporting about the South African president joining his counterparts from Brazil,
Russia, India, and China for the third summit meeting of the informal group in
China).
78. See JIM O'NEILL ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, How SOLID ARE THE BRICS? 7-8

(Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 134, 2005), available at http://
www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf
(advancing
the concept of the N-11 countries in response to questions concerning whether more
"BRICs" are out there). The N-11 countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam. Id. at 7.
79. See JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS
AND BEYOND (2011) (providing an up-to-date analysis of the BRICs and what O'Neill
now terms "growth markets").
80. DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, DREAMING

WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99),
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those of many existing

[I]n less than 40 years, the BRICs' economies together
could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025
they could account for over half the size of the G6.
Currently they are worth less than

15% . . . . Of the

current G6 (US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK) only
the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies
in US dollar terms in 2050.81
If a key goal of the TPP is to open up new or fast-growing
markets, it seems rather ill-advised and short-sighted to exclude
all of these high-growth economies from the negotiations. As
commentators rightly observed, the present lineup in the TPP
negotiations does not provide the United States-or, for that
matter, other negotiating parties-with a lot of trade benefits.8 2

Thus, if the TPP is to have a larger regional economic impact, it
has to grow to include other Asia-Pacific countries. As Sebastian

Herreros declared:
Ultimately, the TPP will have to expand to include large,
mostly Asian economies, to be a meaningful exercise. Its
current commercial appeal is very modest, given the small
size of most participating economies. More importantly, an
agreement limited to the ... nine [and now twelve]
participants would be far from a credible platform for largescale trans-Pacific economic integration.8 3

available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/bricsdream.pdf.
81. Id. at 4.
82. See Jane Kelsey, Introduction to No ORDINARY DEAL, supra note 10, at 10, 18
(" [M]ost of the participating economies are of limited regional importance in Asia and
the Pacific Rim or to the US.").
83. Sebastian Herreros, Coping with Multiple Uncertainties:Latin America in the TPP
Negotiations, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 260, 274; accord Lewis,
Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 (" [Tihe United States' interest in the
Agreement was clearly tied to its potential to expand. This remains the case today, as
the other countries that have joined the negotiation also provide little in the way of
new market access opportunities for the US."); Kimberlee Weatherall, The TPP as a
Case Study of Changing Dynamics for International Intellectual Property Negotiations, in
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, supra note 10, at 50, 60

(" [T]he economic benefits of a TPP between the negotiating parties would be limited;
only if bigger regional economies participate, such as India, South Korea, and China,
will these negotiations generate a real payoff.").
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Obviously, the issues I raised earlier in regard to China are
applicable to other BRICS countries. Consider, for example,
India, the world's second most populous country and the fourth
largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region (behind only the
United States, China, and Japan). Like China, India has "the
potential to redefine the balance of influence and power within
any grouping of which they are a part and the very definition of
the region any new institution claims to represent." 84 India's
emerging role in Asia is so important that some East Asian
countries have welcomed India into the East Asian Summit in an
effort to "provide a 'hedge' against Chinese dominance."85
Many policymakers and commentators have also linked
China and India together when exploring the future
development of the Asia-Pacific region. As Singapore's Senior
Minister Goh Chok Tong declared:
I like to think of new Asia as a mega jumbo jet that is being
constructed. Northeast Asia, comprising China, Japan and
South Korea, forms one wing with a powerful engine. India,
the second wing, will also have a powerful engine. The
Southeast Asian countries form the fuselage. Even if we lack
a powerful engine for growth among the 10 [ASEAN]
countries, we will be lifted by the two wings.86
Some commentators-most notably Pete Engardio, the Asia
correspondent for Business Week-even used the term "Chindia"
to underscore the growing global importance of these two
emerging trade powers.8 7

84. MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC AND
BEYOND 88 (2008) [hereinafter BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC]; see
ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 41 (2009) ("In Asia

... it is a three-way, not a two-way, competition [referring to the competition between
China, India, and the United States]."); see also BILL EMMOTT, RIVALS: HOW THE POWER
STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHINA, INDIA, AND JAPAN WILL SHAPE OUR NEXT DECADE (2009)
(discussing the power struggle between China, India, and Japan in Asia).
85. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 84, at 88.
86. Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister, Republic of Sing., Global City of
Opportunity, Keynote Address at the Singapore Conference in London (Mar. 15,
2005), available at http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/pretoria/
press statements speeches/2005/200503/press_200503_01.html.
87. For discussions of China, India, and the so-called "Chindia," see generally
ASIA'S GIANTS: COMPARING CHINA AND INDIA (Edward Friedman & Bruce Gilley eds.,
2008): CHINDIA: How CHINA AND INDIA ARE REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS (Pete
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Like China, if India is not involved in the TPP negotiations,
it is hard to imagine what incentives the TPP negotiating parties
could provide to induce this country to join the agreement after
its formation. To be certain, India is not an APEC member, even
though it did request to join the organization.8 8 Nevertheless,
India has been actively establishing bilateral and regional
agreements with other trading partners, including members of
ASEAN. 89 India is also currently negotiating an economic
partnership agreement with the European Union, a trading bloc
with size and strength comparable to those of the United

Engardio ed., 2006); DANCING WITH GIANTS: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2007); ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND
THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US
(2007); JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND INDIA

(2006).
88. See BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 84, at 88 (noting

that "India has already tried without success to gain entry to APEC").
89. As Ellen Frost observed:
The Indian government has negotiated a framework agreement with ASEAN
whose ambition and scope resemble the China-ASEAN agreement. It has also
negotiated an economic cooperation agreement with Singapore, which could
be a launching pad of sorts for an India-ASEAN FTA. An FTA with Thailand
is also joining the list. Thanks to these and other diplomatic efforts, New
Delhi now holds its own annual summit meeting with ASEAN in an
"ASEAN+1" arrangement, and India was included in the December 2005 East
Asian Summit.
Frost, supra note 74, at 99 (footnote omitted); Wang, Role of China and India, supra note
53, at 365 ("India might have a stronger incentive for an Asian Economic Community,
as India will relatively gain more benefits from a pan-Asian free trade arrangement.
However, it is not easy to convince China to sincerely endorse such an idea."); see also
Locknie Hsu, China, India and Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, in CHINA, INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 45, at 250, 266-68 (discussing
the South Asian Free Trade Area, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement Between India and Singapore, India's FTAs with Sri Lanka and Bhutan, the
India-MERCOSUR Preference Trade Agreement, and the Agreement on South Asian
Free Trade Area); Chia & Soesastro, supra note 32, at 212-13 (discussing the ASEANIndia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation); Wang, Role of China and India, supra
note 53, at 356-58 (discussing India's regional trade initiatives). But see TAY, supra note
12, at 64 ("India, in many ways, is new to East Asia. While its economy is growing, it is
not fully integrated with the rest of East Asia, and not as central as others. It has
negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN, but this was subject to much haggling
that showed not just economic differences but also that India has not observed and
absorbed the social norms prevailing in ASEAN, and perhaps does not want to. As a
result, India remains peripheral relative to others.").
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States. 90 If these negotiations are not enough, India was
instrumental in the development of the India-Brazil-South Africa
Dialogue Forum (IBSA), which features trilateral cooperation
among Brazil, India, and South Africa. 9 1 It is also one of the five
key participants of the BRICS Summit. 92 If all of these
developments become fruitful, India will be able to diversify its
trade portfolio away from reliance on the regional market
covered by the TPP.
Apart from India (and Russia, the other BRICS country in
the Asia-Pacific region), the same analysis can be extended,
perhaps to a lesser extent, to other large developing countries in
the region, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
South Korea93 (although the last two countries have expressed
interest in joining the negotiations 94 ). To some extent, the
exclusion of the BRICS and other fast-growing, emerging
middle-income
countries
has raised
a difficult and
90. See Patralekha Chatterjee, Leaked IP Chapter of India-EUFTA Shows TRIPS-Plus
Pitfalls for India, Expert Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2013, 5:35 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/12/leaked-ip-chapter-of-india-eu-fta-shows-tripsplus-pitfalls-for-india-expert-says/
(reporting about the leaked draft text of the
intellectual property chapter of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement).
91. As stated in IBSA's website:
Established in June 2003, IBSA is a coordinating mechanism amongst three
emerging countries, three multiethnic and multicultural democracies, which
are determined to:
* contribute to the construction of a new international architecture
* bring their voice together on global issues
* deepen their ties in various areas.
IBSA also opens itself to concrete projects of cooperation and partnership
with less developed countries.
IBSA Trilateral Official Website: About IBSA Background, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/
about-ibsa/background (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
92. See Hervieu, supra note 77.
93. Cf. Lim et al., Conclusion, supra note 63, at 323 (" [Elvery clause in the
Agreement must be negotiated with at least one eye on potential future members ....
It is not simply Viet Nam that must be accommodated in the TPP, but other countries
like the Philippines and Papua New Guinea.").
94. See South KoreaMoves Closer to joining TPP Trade Talks, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2013,
4:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-korea-trade-tpp-idUSBRE9
AS06M20131129 (reporting that the South Korean government "said it would make a
final decision on whether to formally join the [TPP] based on the outcome of talks with
the member countries"); Thailand Says to join Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/usasia-obama-trade-idUSBRE8AH06R20121118 (reporting Thai Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra stating that Thailand wouldjoin the TPP negotiations).
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diplomatically perplexing question concerning why the TPP
negotiations have included some developing countries in the
region while ignoring other more qualified ones. From the
current list of twelve countries, it is indeed hard to divine the
logic behind the countries chosen to negotiate the TPP, other
than historical legacy and the self-interested preferences of the
more powerful negotiating parties. 95 This lack of easily
discernible logic becomes particularly problematic when viewed
against the background of frequent, vocal complaints about the
double standard in US foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific
countries.96 The hard-to-explain negotiating lineup also has
greatly affected the dynamics of the TPP negotiations. 97
95. See Buchanan, supra note 60, at 82 (" [T]he impact on multilateral trade of the
growing strategic competition between the US and China in the Western Pacific may
have a significant influence on the way in which TPP expansion is approached by the
actors involved.").
96. As Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's former Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, observed:
The regime in Myanmar overturned the results of the democratic elections in
1990 and brutally suppressed the popular demonstrations that followed.
Myanmar was punished with Western sanctions. Asian governments were
criticised for not enthusiastically following suit.
The regime in Algeria overturned the results of the democratic elections in
1992 and brutally suppressed the popular demonstrations that followed.
Algeria was not punished with Western sanctions. The Asian governments
have never been provided with an explanation for this obvious double
standard.
KISHORE MAHBUBANI, CAN ASIANS THINK? 87 (4th ed. 2009). Likewise, Mark Beeson
wrote:
As the most prominent and influential champion of global democratic
reform, the USA plays an especially critical role in placing reformist pressure
on some of the governments of the region. In this regard, it is important to
note that the USA's concern about human rights abuses and the importance
of democratic procedures is highly selective, and determined by a wider
strategic calculus. Consequently China, which is still viewed primarily as a
strategic competitor, a challenger for regional influence, and associated with
major trade imbalances, is subjected to much hectoring about its human
rights record. By contrast, because of the war on terror, the USA has taken a
much more indulgent view of human rights abuses and non-democratic
processes in countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, which have cracked
down on supposedly subversive elements or discouraged radical Islamism.
BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 73, at 138. A former Chinese
finance minister went even further to suggest that the US foreign policy had "a triple
standard": "For their own human rights problems they shut their eyes .... For some
other countries' human rights questions they open one eye and shut the other. And for
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If one goes back to the "P3," the TPP's predecessor, the
choice of the negotiating parties is not hard to discern. Chile,
New Zealand, and Singapore all have small markets with highly
liberalized trade sectors. 98 Based on World Bank indicators in
2002, the year the P3 was established, these countries had a
gross domestic product of approximately 71, 65, and 92 billion,
respectively.99 Their location on three different continents also
made the P3 an attractive vehicle to provide entry points into
regional networks. 100 As the number of TPP negotiating parties
China, they open both eyes and stare." Thomas L. Friedman, Deal with China Urged by

Bentsen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at A20 (quoting Chinese Finance Minister Liu
Zhongli).
97. As Henry Gao observed in regard to Brunei Darussalam:
[T] he Brunei market is too small and insignificant for the other parties. If we
look at the negotiating history of the P4 Agreement, we can see that the talks
were interrupted several times due to the reluctance of Chile. While there
might be real political difficulties at home, such reluctance on the side of
Chile, coupled with eagerness on the side of New Zealand, gave Chile more
bargaining power in the process and that is why Chile, from a mercantilist
point of view, got much more than the other parties in the final Agreement.
This sets a rather bad example for the other potential members: if the P4
Agreement cannot even handle the pressure from a country that is at best a
regional power, how can it deal with the pressure from a superpower like the
US?
Gao, From the P4 to the TPP,supra note 57, at 72.
98. See Chia & Soesastro, supra note 32, at 222-23 (noting that the P4 members
are among the most open economies in the Pacific").
99. Data: GDP (CurrentUS$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=2 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
100. As I explained in an earlier article:
Strategically, FTAs and EPAs provide important entry points into other
regional or plurilateral networks. In doing so, they allow developed countries
to explore interstate relationships with a smaller number of countries. Such
an arrangement helps reduce the complexity and high costs of negotiation
with a large number of parties or a complex regional body. The negotiation
of the agreements also helps countries test the feasibility of applying specific
models to a particular region. In fact, because the agreements involve selfselected parties, they allow parties to avoid negotiation of issues that would
require them to make concessions that are important to their domestic
constituencies. The exclusion of issues will also quicken the negotiation
process, as those issues tend to slow down, if not derail, the negotiations.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 970-71; see also Sidney Weintraub, Lessons
from the Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 79, 79 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) (noting that the United
States' free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore were "intended to be
bellwethers for future FTAs in both regions, some bilateral and others plurilateral, as
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grows, however, it has become increasingly difficult to separate

the insiders from the outsiders based on economic size, trade
patterns, or sectors that are targeted for trade liberalization (see
TABLE 1).101
TABLE 1. Exports and Imports in World Merchandise Trade in 2012102

Country

Exports (US$B)

Imports (US$B)

Australia

257

261

Brunei Darussalam

13

4

Canada

455

475

Chile

78

79

Japan

799

886

Malaysia

227

197

Mexico

371

380

New Zealand

37

38

Peru

46

43

Singapore

408

380

United States

1546

2336

Vietnam

115

114

well as to set the substantive parameters for the hemispherewide Free Trade Area of the
Americas").
101. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and Patrick Low observed:
One of the unusual elements of the TPP is the fact that members of the TPP
represent a range of economic development, from the world's largest
economy to a lower middle income economy. While members have been
clear that the TPP will not have any sort of "two speed" or explicit special and
differential (S&D) treatment for developing country members, it is true that
the final Agreement will need to have some provisions to account for the
developmental aspects of some members.
Lim et al., "High-Quality, Twenty-First Century," supra note 53, at 12.
102. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, at 24 (2013);
Trade Profiles: Brunei Darussalam, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://stat.wto.org/
CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=BN
(last visited
Apr. 21, 2014).
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To make matters more complicated, the sectors that
countries seek to liberalize through trade agreements vary
significantly even within the developing world. Consider the
difference between India and Brazil. Although Brazil's
geographical location will likely preclude it from participating in
the TPP negotiations or joining the agreement after its
formation, the comparison between these two BRICS countries
is highly instructive. 103 As Professor Cho noted in relation to the
complex positions the G-20 countries took during the Fifth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancain, "while India still wants
to protect domestic agricultural industries, Brazil, a member of
the Cairns Group consisting of agricultural product exporters,
wants to further liberalize trade in this area." 10 4 Likewise, Sonia
Rolland observed:
Brazil had a liberal approach to further its export interest,
whereas India maintained conservative positions with
respect to liberalization of the agriculture sector and had a
protectionist stance. Brazil's shift toward a more aggressive
stance on agriculture corresponded to its liberalization of
the agricultural sector and the increased pressure by
103. It is also worth noting that the ASEAN+6 countries "accounted for 28 percent
of Brazilian exports and 32 percent of its imports in 2010." Herreros, supra note 83, at
275.
104. Cho, supra note 27, at 236; see alsoJean Touscoz, A ChangingPolicy Landscape,
in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE
UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT 287, 288 (Surendra J.

Patel et al. eds., 2001) (" [T]he 'big five' non-members of OECD (Russia, China, Brazil,
India and Indonesia) do not always act in concert; the least developed countries
themselves do not present a common front."). As Simon Tay elaborated:
The G-20 is primarily designed on power rather than norms. While this is a
concern in many other regions, the question of power is especially tense in
Asia, where small and medium-sized countries that are open to the global
economy have sought to work alongside larger countries. Many of the Asian
forms of cooperation have emphasized equality, in contrast to the underlying
G-20 principle of size and power. If the Asians who are in the G-20 try to
dictate to the others in the region, this would conflict with the existing
forums and norms of intra-Asian cooperation. This is especially true in
finance and trade, which involve questions of competition and different
interests between countries. To focus on power in Asia will also probably
sharpen differences. Rivalries among the Asian members of the G-20 will
simmer and could boil over.
TAY, supra note 12, at 166.
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domestic investors on the government on this issue both in
negotiating rounds and in dispute settlement (particularly
in disputes with Europe and the United States).105
Thus, even though policymakers and commentators often
focus on the dichotomy between developed and developing
countries, serious and complicated variations exist in the
positions taken by the latter in both multilateral and
nonmultilateral fora. In certain sectors, such as intellectual
property, the main dividing line is not often drawn across the
stage of economic development. Rather, it concerns the
country's propensity to export intellectual property-based goods
and services or economic reliance on such exports. 106 Although
the United States has greatly benefited from the TRIPS
Agreement and the international intellectual property system,
the same cannot be said of all members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"). 107
If the divergent positions taken by developing countries in
relation to their export sectors have raised complications, the
inclusion of non-trade issues, such as environmental and labor
standards, has posed even greater problems.10 8 Consider, for
example, my hometown Hong Kong, an APEC member that has
not yet joined the TPP, but has entered into a closer economic

105. Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal
Support, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 483, 495 (2007).
106. Cf Susan Corbett, Regulationfor CulturalHeritage Orphans: Time Does Matter, 1
WIPO J. 180, 181 (2010) (making the distinction between "countries which are netimporters of copyright works ... [and] the net-copyright exporting countries, such as
the United States and the United Kingdom").
107. See J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the
Uruguay Round 11 (Asia Development Bank, ERD Working Paper Series No. 21, 2002),
available
at
http://www.adb.org/documents/ERD/Working Papers/wp021.pdf
(providing a table documenting changes of net annual patent rent obligations resulting
from the full application of the TRIPS Agreement).
108. See generally Lorand Bartels, Social Issues: Labour, Environment and Human
Rights, in BRTA COMMENTARY, supra note 60, at 342 (discussing the labor and
environmental standards in the TPP Agreement); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Labour
Standardsand the TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 200 (discussing
the labor standards in the TPP Agreement); Murphy, supra note 57, at 195-97
(discussing those standards); Jeffrey J. Schott & Julia Muir, Environmental Issues in the
TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 187 (discussing the
environmental standards in the TPP Agreement).
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partnership agreement with New Zealand 09 and a free trade
agreement with Chile. 110 Hong Kong has been ranked the
world's freest economy for the past two decades since the
inception of the Index of Economic Freedom, published
annually by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage
Foundation.1 1 1 While the region's heavy emphasis on economic
freedom has led it to welcome the TPP's trade liberalization
goals, that same emphasis has made it somewhat reluctant to
embrace the agreement's labor and environmental standards. As
important as these standards are, they could easily jeopardize
Hong Kong's reputation as the world's freest economy.
To complicate matters even further, many countries in the
Asia-Pacific region have highly uneven economic and
technological developments. As a result, they harbor
"schizophrenic" preferences when deciding how to strike the
most appropriate balance in the intellectual property system.11 2
As I noted in the past:
While [large developing countries such as China and India]
may want stronger protection for their fast-growing
industries and highly economically developed regions, they
want weaker protection in the remaining areas. The
economies of these countries, indeed, are highly complex,
and the profound sub-regional disparities in socio-economic
conditions and technological capabilities have made it very
difficult to implement nation-based intellectual property
standards.113
In sum, the TPP does not include enough fast-growing,
emerging middle-income economies to generate a large
economic impact within the Asia-Pacific region. With a large
109. Hong Kong, China-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement,
H.K-N.Z., Mar. 29, 2010, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/
hknzcep/text agreement.html.
110. Free Trade Agreement between Hong Kong, China and Chile, Chile-H.K,
Sept. 7, 2012, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/ trade relations/hkclfta/ text
agreement.html.
111. See 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: Hong Kong, http://www.heritage.org/
index/country/hongkong (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (stating that, " [t]hroughout the
20-year history of the Index, Hong Kong has been rated the world's freest economy").
112. SeeYu, InternationalEnclosure, supra note 19, at 21-33.
113. Peter K Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 559
(2009).
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number of negotiating parties and chapters, the cross-sector
disagreements among these parties also have made the TPP
negotiations highly challenging. In fact, because the TPP has
strong historical and continued ties to APEC, deadlocks in the
negotiations could undermine the ability of APEC or other
regional fora to provide an effective venue for further trade
liberalization. 114 APEC is particularly important to the TPP
because "[m]any of the big announcements about the
[agreement] are made in conjunction with APEC meetings."1 15
The organization "is also an important incubator of ideas that
could be taken into account in the TPP negotiations."11 6
III. EUROPE
The third group of outsiders consists of European
countries, including the twenty-eight members of the European
Union and other countries in the region such as Switzerland.
The exclusion of this group is logical, given the TPP's regional
focus and the group members' geographical location. It would
indeed be odd to admit the European Union or Switzerland into
APEC. Nevertheless, the exclusion of Europe has greatly affected
the dynamics of the TPP negotiations. Such exclusion also has
serious ramifications for the future development of
nonmultilateral agreements within the Asia-Pacific region.

114. See Carlos Kuriyama, APEC and the TPP: Are They Mutually Reinforcing?, in
10, at 242, 243 (" [T]he TPP itself is proving
extremely useful for APEC as well, by demonstrating the utility of some of the ideas that
have been discussed for years within the non-binding context of APEC. The TPP is
actually providing one of the many avenues to strengthen regional economic
integration in the APEC region."); see also BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC,
supra note 84, at 16 ("The key issue facing the Asia-Pacific region is whether it has
enough political and ideological internal coherence to allow it to facilitate and
encourage the underlying economic integration that has already occurred."); id. at 53
("Many East Asians were already concerned that the ASEAN way of consensus and
voluntarism was being overthrown by the pushy, insensitive and excessively legalistic
Anglo-Americans as they tried to turn APEC into a forum for negotiation, rather than
discussion."); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 73, at 226 ("Some
member countries were concerned about APEC's inability to deliver trade
liberalization, while others-especially Korea and Japan-were concerned that it might
force them to open politically sensitive domestic sectors to external competition.").
115. Kuriyama, supra note 114, at 243.
116. Id.
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note
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Consider, for example, the negotiation of intellectual
property standards. The omission of European countries has
affected not only the dynamics of the negotiation process, but
also the types of issues that are to be negotiated. Without the
European Union at the negotiation table, the United States is
able to rely more on its sheer economic and geopolitical
strengths to push for provisions that are in the interests of its
intellectual property industries.11 7 From increased enforcement
in the digital environment to greater protection of
pharmaceutical products and biologics, the TPP is likely to track
more closely to the high US standards than the compromised
standards developed in other fora, including ACTA. 118
It is therefore no surprise that the TPP negotiations have
resurrected those treaty terms that have already been rejected in
other plurilateral negotiations involving the European Union,
including the ACTA negotiations.1 19 These terms range from the
safe harbors for online service providers to provisions on
"cooperation" between copyright holders and these providers in
the area of copyright enforcement. 120 It is also not unusual to
find the United States dominating the negotiation of the TPP
intellectual property chapter. The technical expertise
commanded by the large US intellectual property delegation has
117. See Elms & Lim, supra note 53, at 37 ("Even Australia, regarded as the second
most powerful state at the TPP table [at the time of the writing], was unable to prevail
over the United States in bilateral negotiations.").
118 . See Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 26 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup].
119. See Patricia Ranald, The Politics of the TPPA in Australia, in No ORDINARY
DEAL, supra note 10, at 40, 40 ("The negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership
agreement ... resurrect many of the issues that were debated in the Australia-US Free
Trade Agreement."); Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 118, at 27 ("The TPP negotiators
could also revive proposals that were rejected by the ACTA negotiators, especially the
EU delegates."); see also Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 15, at 291 ("Even for those
countries that have existing bilateral PTAs with the US (Australia, Chile, Peru and
Singapore), the TPP negotiations have provided the US with a new opportunity to push
for changes in their trade partners' domestic regulatory regimes that it was unable to
secure in the earlier agreements.").
120. See Analysis of the Text of the Leaked TPP Intellectual Property Text Dated August
2013, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, http://infojustice.org/tpp-leak-analysis (last visited Feb. 17,
2014) (providing a collection of analyses of the leaked draft text of the TPP intellectual
property chapter). See generally Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposalforan Intellectual
Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 105
(2012) (discussing the US proposal for the TPP intellectual property chapter).
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simply overwhelmed the delegates from other TPP negotiating
parties.
As if the United States' economic and negotiation strengths
were not enough, the country could offer concessions in other
trade or trade-related areas in exchange for greater concessions
in the intellectual property area. For instance, New Zealand may
find it beneficial to make greater concessions in the intellectual
property area if the United States is willing to allow for more
exports in dairy, lamb, wool, and other sheep products.12 1 The
same can be said about Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia
in regard to the United States' concessions in textiles. 122 By
contrast, the European Union is unlikely to find similar
121. As Deborah Elms observed:
Dairy has been a headache for negotiators. Because the United States does
not have a [preferential trade agreement] with New Zealand, this sector has
never been addressed between the two countries before (unlike, say, the
dispute between the United States and Australia over sugar). The primary
issue for American milk producers is that New Zealand's dairy industry is
viewed as a monopoly, with one firm (Fonterra) in control of 90 percent of
the market, and substantial barriers to entry into the market. If the American
market were to be opened to competition through a [preferential trade
agreement] like the TPP, dairy farmers feared that New Zealand dairy would
enjoy unfair competitive advantages.
Deborah K. Elms, Negotiations over Market access in Goods, in TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 10, at 109, 117; see also id. at 117 n.29 (providing an estimate
of the National Milk Producers Federation that "US dairy producers would lose gross
revenues of US$20 billion over the first ten years of a [preferential trade agreement] ");
Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 367-68 ("New Zealand's main economic
interest in the TPP is the potential for expanded access to the United States market for
its dairy products. While New Zealand might ultimately be willing to trade off higher
intellectual property standards in exchange for such market access, if dairy were to be
excluded from the TPP, New Zealand would struggle to find enough value in the
agreement to remain a participant."). Nevertheless, Bryan Gould expressed skepticism
about New Zealand's perceived benefits provided by the TPP:
We are . . . deluding ourselves if we believe that an enlarged free trade area
will deliver wider markets and better returns for New Zealand exports, but
will somehow spare us the obvious downsides. The likelihood is that New
Zealand's already depleted reserves of capital, talent and natural resources
will be attracted to more promising prospects elsewhere in the wider free
trade area, with the result that the country's overall economic performance is
more likely to decline in comparative terms than to improve.
Bryan Gould, PoliticalImplicationsfor New Zealand, in No ORDINARY DEAL, supra note 10,
at 29, 34.
122. See Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 388 ("Vietnam, and to a
lesser extent, Malaysia, have highly competitive textile industries.").
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concessions attractive enough to give up its proposals on
intellectual property protection and enforcement. Thus, without
the European Union's involvement in the negotiations, the
United States has a much easier time getting its intellectual
property-related proposals accepted by other negotiating
parties.
It is worth recalling that, during the ACTA negotiations, the
European Union and the United States had wide and deep
disagreements over quite a number of issues. For example, the
United States wanted to have stronger mandates concerning
digital intellectual property enforcement, yet the European
Union was not ready to agree to provisions that the Union had
not yet harmonized. Examples of these yet-to-harmonize areas
are the introduction of a graduated response system and safe
harbors for online service providers.1 23 Similarly, although the
European Union pushed hard for the inclusion of criminal
liability for infringement on all forms of intellectual property
rights (including most notably geographical indications), the
United States was reluctant to provide such broad coverage. 124 In
the end, the two countries could only settle on a much more
moderate agreement than what was originally advanced by both
sides-an agreement that observers have since dubbed "ACTA
Lite." 125
Apart from impacting on the dynamics of the TPP
negotiations, excluding Europe from the agreement could raise
complicated questions concerning the future development of
the international regulatory environment and the multilateral
trading system. On June 17, 2013, the European Union and the
United States launched the negotiation of the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") Agreement. 126 The

123. SeeYu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1055-57.
124. See Monika Ermert, European Commission on ACTA: TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2009/04/22/european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floor-not-ceiling/.
125. Monika Ermert, Treaty Negotiators Turn to "ACTA Lite" in Hopes of Closure,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 8, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/
08/treaty-negotiators-turn-to-%E2%80%9Cacta-lite%E2%80%9D-in-hopes-of-closure/.
126. Press Release, Office of the USTR, U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch
Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Feb. 13, 2013),
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first round of negotiations was held in Washington, D.C. in July
2013. As the USTR declared on its website:
T-TIP will be an ambitious, comprehensive, and highstandard trade and investment agreement that offers
significant benefits in terms of promoting U.S. international
competitiveness, jobs, and growth. This ambitious trade and
investment agreement will aim to boost economic growth in
the United States and the EU and add to the more than 13
million American and EU jobs already supported by
transatlantic trade and investment.12 7
It remains to be seen what impact the TTIP will have on the
TPP negotiations. Would the provisions found in both the TPP
and TTIP create the much-needed nexus between the European
Union and the TPP negotiating parties?1 28 Would the TTIP serve
as the missing link between free trade agreements established by
the United States (including the TPP) and the free trade and
economic partnership agreements established by the European
Union? Would the TTIP raise the standards embraced by the

available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/
statement-US-EU-Presidents.
127 . Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
128. As Meredith Lewis observed:
To the extent that would-be participants (and dual participants) are
wondering whether their commitments made in the TPP or the RCEP would
be more likely to become multilateralized, (de jure through the WTO process
or defacto through additional FTA proliferation), the TTIP would suggest the
answer to that question is the TPP. Presumably the United States would, in
TTIP negotiations, seek to import in as many commonalities as possible with
the TPP in order to create common rules across even more countries. If the
EU and the TPP countries all take a common approach to an issue-for
example, state-owned enterprises-then that has a better chance of becoming
the global approach than anything developed within the RCEP. At the same
time, the understanding that the U.S. will be seeking to include TPPconsistent provisions into the TTIP may well make countries participating in
both the RCEP and TPP more intent on fighting for the terms they want in
the TPP. This could result in more protracted TPP negotiations, but it also
creates an incentive to conclude the agreement soon. If the EU were to push
the U.S. in the TTIP towards a position the TPP participants didn't like, that
situation would be more dangerous the farther from completion the TPP was
at the time. Once terms are locked in via the TPP, however, it would seem
unlikely the U.S. would pursue a contradictory approach in the TTIP.
Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 33, at 370-71.
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TPP negotiating parties, due in part to the already high EU and
US standards and in part to the limited need for these two
trading powers to foster compromises in the form of exceptions,
limitations, safeguards, and flexibilities? Would the TTIP involve
an entirely different set of issues and concerns and therefore
create inconsistencies or even conflicts that further complicate
the existing international regulatory environment and
multilateral trading system? These are all questions that do not
have clear and immediate answers.
Within the Asia-Pacific region, the exclusion of Europe
from the TPP could also raise complications concerning the
future development of nonmultilateral trade and investment
agreements, especially those established by the European
Union. Regardless of whether the TTIP will become successful,
it is important to explore what the TPP negotiations will mean
for the European Union. If the TPP were established, would the
United States become more effective in trading with the TPP
members to the detriment of Europe? If so, would the European
Union and other European countries respond by negotiating
their own bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements with
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, similar to the economic
partnership agreements that the European Union has already
established with South Korea and is now negotiating with India,
Malaysia, Singapore, and other members of ASEAN? 129
One could also ask some specific questions about the global
transplant of international trade and regulatory standards. For
example, if the TPP were established, would the TPP
negotiations make US models more dominant in the Asia-Pacific
region than European and other models, due in part to the
successful transplant of US standards onto the TPP Agreement
and eventually on to the soil of other TPP members? 30 If so,
129 . See Free Trade Agreements, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/international/facilitating-trade/free-trade/
(last visited Feb. 17,
2014) (providing a list of EU free trade agreements concluded and in negotiation).
130. For discussions of legal transplants in the intellectual property area, see Peter
K Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J.
(forthcoming 2014); Peter K Yu, DigitalCopyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong
Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010). See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993)
legal transplant thesis).

(articulating the

2014]

TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES

1169

would such transplants precipitate greater rivalry between the
European Union and the United States over what standards they
seek to export to other countries via bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional trade and investment agreements? Would such rivalry
lead to inconsistencies, tensions, or conflicts over trade and
regulatory standards?1 31 Would this rivalry precipitate what I
have called the "battle of the FTAs"?13 2
In sum, even though the geographical location of
European countries has made it logical for them to be excluded
from the TPP, such exclusion could have serious ramifications
for the negotiations and the agreement's benefits, significance,
and viability. Such exclusion could also affect the negotiation of
other nonmultilateral trade and investment agreements in the
Asia-Pacific region as well as the future development of the
international regulatory environment and the multilateral
trading system.

131. As Robert Scollay wrote:
A particular problem for convergence arises if more than one major economy
establishes its own FTA "template", and if there are inconsistencies between
the different "templates". The outlook then is for the establishment of
multiple "hub and spoke" configurations centred on each major economy as
a "hub", where the FTAs in each configuration converge on the "template"
of the "hub", but where the prospect of convergence between the
configurations with their inconsistent "templates" is remote. Other
economies may then either seek to follow one of the "hub" templates in their
own FTAs, as Mexico has tended to do (essentially following the NAFTA
template), or, if they seek to participate in more than one "hub and spoke"
configuration, be willing to adapt the design of their FTAs to the "template"
of each configuration, as Chile and Singapore have tended to do.
Robert Scollay, Prospectsfor Linking PreferentialTrade Agreements in the Asia-PacificRegion,
in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 32, at 164, 185; see also Peter K Yu, Currents
and Crosscurrentsin the InternationalIntellectualProperty Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 323,
398-99 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the potential
conflicts between different bilateral and regional trade agreements); Yu, Access to
Medicines, supra note 77, at 386 (suggesting that "conflicts may arise if less developed
countries sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and
the United States without appropriate review and modification").
132. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 31, at 1018-27 (discussing the
"battle of the FTAs").
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IV. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
While the first three groups of TPP outsiders consist of state
actors, the last group comprises non-state actors. Similar to the
ACTA negotiations, the TPP negotiations have been widely
criticized for their lack of transparency, accountability, and
democratic participation. Notably omitted is the representation
of civil society organizations, which Sisule Musungu and Graham
Dutfield have considered "the single most important factor in
raising the issue of the impact of the international intellectual
property standards . . . on development issues such as health,

food and agriculture."1 33 Although the USTR insisted that the
TPP is negotiated in a similar manner as the negotiation of
other bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements-at
least according to the USTR 134 -its secretive negotiations stand
in sharp contrast to other more transparent international
negotiations, including the region-based Free Trade Area of the
Americas and those concerning the WTO and UN specialized
agencies, such as WIPO.135
In the past, the public is generally not interested in trade or
intellectual property treaty negotiations, which are dull, legalese,
complex, and highly technical. 136 Nevertheless, as the

133. Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, MultilateralAgreements and a TRIPSplus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 22 (Quaker United
Nations Office, TRIPS Issues Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://
www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)finalO304.pdf (footnote omitted).
134. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1005 ("Although both the European
Union and the United States have taken more open approaches in negotiations at
WIPO, WTO, WHO, and other international fora, negotiations at the bilateral and
plurilateral levels have indeed been kept secret in the past." (footnote omitted)).
135. For discussions of the openness in WIPO, WTO, the World Health
Organization, and other international fora, see Letter from Robert Weissman, Dir.,
Essential Action, to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. 1-3 (Sept. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document Library/Fact Sheets/2008/asset uplo
ad file98915121.pdf; Memorandum from Elec. Frontier Found. et al. to Ron Kirk, U.S.
Trade Rep., attachment 1 (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.keionline.org/miscdocs/4/attachmentl transparency ustr.pdf.
136. See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (2006)

("For many citizens, Intellectual Property ... is an obscure and distant domain-its
laws shrouded in jargon and technical mystery, its applications relevant only to a
specialist audience."); SELL, supra note 28, at 99 ("To a certain extent IP law is
reminiscent of the Catholic Church when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are
privileged purveyors of expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy."); Yu, Currents and
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negotiations became more intrusive on one's personal life and
as the negotiated agreements began to include provisions
concerning the internet and the digital environment, civil
society organizations and the public at large have begun paying
greater attention to the standards included in these agreements.
For example, the negotiation of ACTA led to the
widespread online coverage of the leaked drafts and updates on
the negotiations.13 7 The effort to adopt the agreement in the
European Union also led to massive street protests throughout
Europe in the middle of the winter-in major cities such as
Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen, Krakow, Munich, Paris,
Prague, Sofia, Stockholm, and Vienna.138 In addition, "a petition
of 2 million signatures was handed in to the European
Parliament, and thousands of emails were sent to Members of
the European Parliament." 139 These protests and signatures not
only "ignited coverage of ACTA in the mainstream media, which
had largely ignored the issue up to that point," 140 but eventually
led to the European Parliament's resounding rejection of the
trade agreement in June 2012.141 This rejection marked the first
Crosscurrents, supra note 131, at 419 ("In the past, intellectual property issues were
considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical.").
137. As I observed in an earlier article:
While disclosure of official information remained sparse at this stage of
negotiations, civil liberties groups had been active in providing information
to help the public understand the agreement's potential impact. For
example, in March 2008, more than a couple of months before the first
round of negotiations, IP Justice published a pioneering and very informative
white paper discussing the potential negotiation items on ACTA. Academics
and civil liberties groups across the world also worked hard to obtain
information through FOIA, the Canadian Access to Information Act, or their
equivalents. Many of them even managed to obtain "leaked" information or
documents, which were quickly posted onto the Internet via WikiLeaks and
other websites. In addition, commentators-most notably Professor Geistoffered concise yet valuable commentary on the potential provisions while
keeping the public up-to-date about the state of the negotiations.
Yu, Six Secret Fears,supra note 56, at 1016-17 (footnotes omitted).
138. See MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: How CORPORATE
LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS 107-14 (2013).
139. Id. at 115.
140. Id. at 108.
141. "The final outcome was rejection of ACTA by an astonishing 478 votes to 39,
with 165 abstentions." Id. at 127; see also id. at 106 ("In 2012 that all changed, and
ACTA exploded onto the public stage with massive street protests in sub-zero
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time the Committee on International Trade of the European
Parliament struck down a trade agreement.142
In the United States, the entertainment industry's push for
controversial domestic copyright legislation, such as the
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) 14 3 and the Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA), 144 also led to an unprecedented, massive service
blackout launched by Wikipedia, Reddit, WordPress, and other
internet companies. 145 This blackout, in turn, caused
Congressional representatives to quickly withdraw their support
for the controversial bills, leading SOPA and PIPA to die in the
112th Congress. 146 As Senator Ron Wyden succinctly
summarized in his reminder to then-USTR Ronald Kirk in a

Senate Finance Committee hearing, "[t]he norm changed on
Jan. 18, 2012, when millions and millions of Americans said we
will not accept being locked out of debates about Internet
freedom." 147
To some extent, the recent massive public protests can be
traced back to the anti-globalization protests at the turn of this
millennium in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, and
Genoa. 148 What is different today, however, is the protestors'

temperatures, forcing government U-turns and prompting accusations that the EU had
engaged in corrupt policymaking.").
142. See Monika Ermert, Unprecedented Vote: EU Parliament Trade Committee Rejects
ACTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 21, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2012/06/21/unprecedented-vote-eu-parliament-trade-committee-rejects-acta/.
143. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). See generally
Letter from John R. Allison, Professor, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, et al. to Members of the
U.S. Cong. (July 5, 2011), available at http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPAHouse
letter withPROTECTIPletter FINAL.pdf (arguing against the adoption of the
PROTECT-IP Act). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author signed onto this letter.
144. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
145. See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against
Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at Al.
146. SeeYu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 118, at 32-33.
147. Joseph J. Schatz, Technology Groups Worry About Trade Pact, CQTODAY ONLINE
11:47 PM),
http://public.cq.com/docs/news/newsNEWS
(Mar. 13, 2012,
000004045563.html?ref= corg.
148. See Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global Elites: An
Introduction, 10 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (noting the protests); see also
Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 113, at 566 (" [Tihe anti-globalization
protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, Genoa, and other major cities have
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changing and more specific focus. Instead of broad, and at times
vague, issues such as globalization or the WTO, the current
protests target concrete issues, such as what individuals can or
cannot do on the internet. As civil society organizations, civil
liberties groups, consumer advocates, and user communities
become more familiar with the issues in the public intellectual
property debate, and as they gain more knowledge about the
secretive bilateral, plurilateral, and regional negotiations, their
criticisms will become even more powerful. Even if these
individuals and organizations do not always get the specific
complex legal issues entirely correct-as Justin Hughes
lamented 149-their voice and grievances deserve considerable
attention.
Indeed, it is amazing how much activism one can now find
in the intellectual property field. 150 As Amy Kapczynski observed:
Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, that college
students would speak of the need to change copyright law
with "something like the reverence that earlier generations
displayed in talking about social or racial equality"? Or that
advocates of "farmers' rights" could mobilize hundreds of
thousands of people to protest seed patents and an
[intellectual property] treaty? Or that AIDS activists would
helped provide the needed background and momentum to the push for reforms in the
international intellectual property system.").
149. Professor Hughes observed:
What is good about the SOPA/PIPA debate is that significantly more citizens
got involved and the legislative process responded to that activism by
postponing votes on the bills. But the good part came at quite a cost. The
public discourse on SOPA/PIPA quickly became as uninformed, vitriolic, and
warped as our public debates about national healthcare. Corporate behavior
on both sides contributed to the mess-that's no surprise. But so did legal
academics. Academics conflated issues in the bill with an enthusiasm you'd
expect from Rush Limbaugh or Rachel Maddow. Law professors who in an
earlier time would have told you that the Internet interprets control as
damage and routes around it were ready-in the interest of rhetorical
flourish-to oppose the bills with a "don't break the Internet" mantra.
Justin Hughes, Introduction,30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
150. See SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, CONFLICTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2013) (highlighting the social
conflicts precipitated by "[t]he struggles against 'biopiracy', i.e. the private
appropriation of traditional (indigenous) knowledge, the conflicts about file-sharing in
peer-to-peer networks, the coming-together of the access to knowledge (A2K)
movement and the advent of Pirate Parties in various European countries").
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engage in civil disobedience to challenge patents on
medicines? Or that programmers would descend upon the
European Parliament to protest software patents?151
What happened today in the intellectual property field is
very different from the time when the internet just started to
enter the mainstream. One may still remember James Boyle's
pioneering call for the creation of "a politics of intellectual
property" in the mid-1990s when the internet first entered the
mainstream. 15 2 As he declared at that time:
A successful political movement needs a set of
(popularizable) analytical tools which reveal common
interests around which political coalitions can be built. Just
as "the environment" literally disappeared as a concept in
the analytical structure of private property claims, simplistic
"cause and effect" science, and markets characterized by
negative externalities, so too the "public domain" is
disappearing, both conceptually and literally, in an
intellectual property system built around the interests of the
current stakeholders and the notion of the original author.
In one very real sense, the environmental movement
invented the environment so that farmers, consumers,
hunters and birdwatchers could all discover themselves as
environmentalists. Perhaps we need to invent the public
domain in order to call into being the coalition that might
protect it.15 3
Although intellectual property activism still has a long way to go
before it reaches the same level as environmental activism, such
activism has certainly gone a long way since Professor Boyle
made this important call for action.
Finally, one should not ignore how the lack of
transparency, accountability, and democratic participation in
the TPP negotiations could backfire on the longstanding efforts
on the part of the United States and other TPP negotiating

151. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 262, 263 (2008), http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4296&context=fss-papers
(footnotes omitted).
152. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47
DuKE L.J. 87 (1997).
153. Id. at 113.

2014]

TPP AND TRANS-PACIFIC PERPLEXITIES

1175

parties to promote transparency and rule of law in the AsiaPacific region.154 It is indeed disturbing that leaders of these
parties fail to practice what they preach when the message
becomes an inconvenient barrier to achieving economic goals.
Such failure, to some extent, reminds us of the harsh criticisms
these same countries made when Asian leaders prioritized
economic development over the protection for civil and political
rights.155

In fact, if the TPP includes transparency provisions, similar
to other bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or multilateral
agreements, 15 6 those provisions would become some of the most
ironic and hypocritical provisions ever written into a treaty
adopted for the Asia-Pacific region. 15 7 After all, it is very difficult
to find a good justification for a nontransparent, unaccountable,
and undemocratic process to develop a treaty that calls for
transparency. It also makes one wonder whether the way the
TPP is negotiated would create a perverse excuse for
authoritarian governments in the Asia-Pacific region to conduct
affairs in a nontransparent, unaccountable, and undemocratic
manner.
To be certain, these governments might still conduct affairs
in this manner if the TPP were negotiated in a transparent,
accountable, and democratic manner. The "no worse off'
argument was indeed quite frequently offered in response to
this line of criticism. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the
considerable political costs incurred in conducting affairs in a
nontransparent manner. These costs are significant even in
countries that do not offer much political freedom. When the
practices of foreign countries are offered as justifications, much
of the government's political capital will be saved. Without
comparison, the local people in those countries will also lose an

154. Cf. Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1050-59 (discussing how the ACTA
negotiations could backfire on these longstanding efforts).
155. For discussions of the Asian values debate in the human rights area, see
generally sources cited in Peter K Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 337 n.26 (2012).
156. E.g., ACTA, supra note 21, art. 30; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 63.
157. SeeYu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 56, at 1015.

1176 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 37:1129
opportunity to see how negotiations could have been done
differently.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE
The TPP negotiations have raised a lot of important
questions concerning the future development of trade relations
in the Asia-Pacific region, the international regulatory
environment, and the multilateral trading system. It has also
sparked a debate on how bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
agreements should be negotiated in the future,15 8 especially
when these agreements include provisions concerning the
internet and the digital environment. Although it remains
unclear how the TPP negotiations will evolve, or whether China,
India, or other large developing countries in the region would
eventually join the agreement, it is clear that the negotiations
will have harmful consequences if they are conducted in the
same manner as it is today.
For example, the negotiations could lead to the creation of
a tri-polar world, in which three dominant trading systems will
be created under the leadership of China, Europe, and the
United States. 159 If these systems materialize, they could bring
forth inconsistent, or even conflicting, rules and standards that
undermine the international regulatory environment and
multilateral trading system. The TPP negotiations could also
greatly accelerate the development of the RCEP and other
nonmultilateral agreements within the Asia-Pacific region.

158 . See Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional
Agreements,

MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT

FL R

INNOVATION

UND

WETTBEWERB,

http://

www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/Principles for IP provisions in Bilateral and
Regional Agreements finall.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (outlining principles to
facilitate the development of "international rules and procedures that can achieve a
better, mutually advantageous and balanced [international intellectual property]
regulation"); see also Peter K Yu, The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max
Planck Principlesfor Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62
DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 20 (2014) (discussing these principles).
159. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 226 ("The US ... has been
facing the prospect of a world with three major economic trading blocs: the Americas,
the EU and an Asian bloc."). Bryan Mercurio made a similar observation at "The Trans
Pacific Partnership Agreement: Impact and Implications" Workshop at the Faculty of
Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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Although more than half of the TPP negotiating parties
(Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore, and Vietnam) are also negotiating the RCEP,
countries are unlikely to have the ability, resources, and
sustained interest in actively developing two rather similar trade
pacts in the same region. At some point, countries will have to
decide whether they want to focus on one or the other. 160 It is
therefore no surprise that "[a]n analyst with the Asian
Development Bank has predicted that ASEAN+6 and the TPP
will ultimately merge together." 161 Likewise, Merdith Kolsky
Lewis observed:
[Such merger] is a definite possibility. It is hard to envision
economies such as India or China agreeing in the near-term
to the comprehensive liberation on trade in goods that
acceding to the TPP would entail. At the same time, it also
does not seem realistic that in the long-term there will be an
FTAAP that does not include China. Furthermore, should
Korea and Japan agree to join the TPP, it would not be in
China's interest to remain on the outside. . . . [Thus, i]t is
possible that these competing considerations will coalesce
via an ultimate melding together of the TPP with ASEAN+6,
such that non-TPP members of ASEAN+6 phase in their
commitments over a longer and later time period. 162
160. See id. at 231 ("The most likely alternatives to the TPP ... are either
ASEAN+6 or ASEAN+3, or perhaps a new model with a China-Japan-Korea FTA at its
core."); Lewis, TPP andRCEP, supra note 33, at 369-70 ("Of course there is nothing to
stop countries from seeking to join both the TPP and the RCEP, and several countries
in ASEAN seem inclined to do so by seeking to join the TPP. But particularly for
countries with limited human and financial resources for negotiations and those
outside the Asia-Pacific, it will probably be the case that countries will seek to join one
or the other rather than both."); see also id. at 223 (examining the prospects for the
TPP to expand into a FTAAP); Kelsey, supra note 82, at 17-18 (" [T]he TPPA was
envisaged as the foundation for an APEC-wide free trade agreement.").
161. Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 235.
162. Id. Deborah Elms expressed skepticism over such a merger:
Of course, a lot will ultimately depend on what happens with RCEP and the
level of ambition shown. From the beginning however, a merger is already
looking tricky. For instance, RCEP explicitly allows special and differential
treatment for developing economies, while the TPP does not. The TPP
mandates are much broader and deeper than the agenda drawn up by the 16
RCEP parties. It is highly likely that, at the end of the day, the TPP members
will be reluctant to drop down the level of ambition in the TPP to meet the
RCEP or that RCEP members will come up much farther to meet the TPP.
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Finally, just as the United States is willing to negotiate the
TTIP with the European Union, it may be willing to negotiate
separate agreements with other major trading powers in the
Asia-Pacific region, such as China and Japan. The discussion of a
bilateral trade agreement with Japan began in response to the
latter's emergence as an economic power in the 1980s.1 63 Even
though such discussion has now subsided, Japan continues to
play an important role in the region. It is therefore no surprise
that some commentators have wondered whether China's
growing importance in the Asia-Pacific region would lead to
more intense rivalry between China and Japan.164 If such rivalry
[E]ven if a merger of some sort were possible between RCEP and the TPP,
creating a 21 member [preferential trade agreement] in such a fashion would
likely be a poor way to draft an agreement. Docking on and massaging
existing commitments to fit a new environment is less likely to deliver
maximum benefits to all parties than a new agreement negotiated from the
beginning.
Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, at 396-97.
163. See, e.g., Michael Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the
President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25, 33-35 (1989) (questioning the
advantages of a USJapan bilateral trade agreement); Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy:
The Casefor BilateralAgreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 8-17 (1989) (contending that
Japan would be a particularly attractive target for a new bilateral trade agreement).
164. William Callahan disagreed:
Both Japan and China are "reluctant powers" that are not willing to take the
lead in regional integration (indeed, the main activities of each seem to
involve forestalling the other from assuming regional leadership). This
reluctance stems from a regional environment that is characterized by fears of
Japan's past (militarism) and of China's future (hegemonism). The Japanese
empire regionalized East Asia during the first half of the twentieth century,
and Chinese and Korean memories of this period still stress the violence of
Japanese occupation and colonialism. Because of this suspicion of its
intentions, Japan repeatedly failed to shape an East Asian regionalism in the
1960s and 1970s.
China has been unable to take the lead in forming regional institutions
because its East Asian neighbours worry about the character of Chinese
hegemony. Its recent rapid economic growth and military modernization
present a potential threat to regional order and stability. Moreover, there are
concerns that China's future leadership will follow the pattern of its imperial
past. Some fear that the PRC is modernizing the traditional Sinocentric
order, where the Middle Kingdom is surrounded by a periphery of tributary
states and barbarians, as a model for its new hegemonic politics.
William A. Callahan, ComparativeRegionalism: The Logic of Governance in Europe and Asia,
in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS 231, 242-43 (David Kerr &

Liu Fei eds., 2007) (footnote omitted); see also Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China's
Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT, supra note 74, at 48, 55 ("China understands that the
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occurs, Japan may be eager to foster a stronger alliance with the
United States, India, and other major countries in the AsiaPacific region. 165 Countries in the region may also welcome the
United States to play a larger role 166 -a role that will certainly
benefitJapan.
Recent years have also seen growing discussions of the need
for a bilateral investment agreement between China and the
United States. 167 Such an agreement is especially attractive
among those advocating greater engagement between China
and the United States in the form of a G-2 partnership.168 After
future of the region depends upon a constructive relationship between China and
Japan."). Simon Tay concurred:
Asian regionalism is moving forward-but without clear direction and
leadership. Without change in Japan, there can be no rapprochement with
China. This deprives East Asian regionalism of what should logically be its
main driver, a partnership between China and Japan, akin to that in Europe
between France and Germany. The idea of a shared leadership with China
seems alien to the Japanese, and vice versa. Asia's contentious history
combines with fundamental differences to raise tensions and lead to flash
points between Japan and China that the region has no proven capacity to
handle.
TAY, supra note 12, at 82.
165. As Professor Tay explained:
As China continues to grow and charm fellow Asians, Japan cannot compete
on its own. It recognizes this and has clung to its alliance with the United
States and, in 2007, reached out to Australia, the closest American ally in Asia.
Similarly, Japan has been reaching out economically to engage India as a
counterweight to China. Even if Japan cannot compete with China in the
near future, or even presently, it can be spoiler in Asian regionalism. Japan
might limit Asia's effective progress by lack of cooperation or by taking steps
to bandwagon against China, forcing rivalry and tension as other Asians find
they have to choose sides.
TAY, supra note 12, at 81-82.
166. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 34, at 232 (" [G]iven concerns about
China's economic and military might, some Asian Countries may welcome the US
playing a greater role in the region, and the opportunity to forge linkages with the
US.").
167. For discussions of such an agreement, see generally David A. Gantz,
Challenges for the United States in Negotiating a BIT with China: Reconciling Reciprocal
Investment Protection with Policy Concerns, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming
2014); Kong Qingjiang, U.S.-China BilateralInvestment Treaty Negotiations: Context, Focus,
and Implications,7 ASIANJ. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181 (2012).
168. As Fred Bergsten argued:
The United States should ... implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic
economic strategy toward China. Instead of focusing on bilateral problems
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all, in recent years, China and the United States have already
actively cooperated in addressing a large variety of global
problems, which range from climate change to global economic
recovery. As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues reminded us:
It is now clear that an effective response to every major
international economic issue requires close cooperation
between [China and the United States]. There will be no
sustained recovery from the global economic crisis unless
China and the United States lead it and they have
appropriately launched by far the largest stimulus programs
in the world. There will be no renewed momentum toward
trade liberalization through the Doha Round or otherwise, a
credible defense against the protectionist pressures that
have been intensified by the crisis, unless they endorse it.
There will be no international cooperation on global
warming unless they embrace it. The United States is the
world's largest deficit and debtor country, and China is the
world's largest surplus and creditor country, and without
and complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system
that it would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to
develop a true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that
system, even if the system requires substantial modifications to persuade
China to play that role. The two economic superpowers should begin to
pursue together the development of coordinated, or at least cooperative,
approaches to global issues that can be resolved effectively only through their
active co-management. Such a "G-2" approach would accurately recognize,
and be perceived by the Chinese as accurately recognizing, the new role of
China as a legitimate architect and steward of the international economic
order.
BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 22-23; see also STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING
CONSENSUS: How CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 25 (2010)
("[T]he American and Chinese economies are heavily

interdependent. America has grown addicted to Chinese credit; China has grown
equally addicted to American consumption. The depth of this interdependence creates
a relationship that is stabilized in a kind of economic version of mutually assured
destruction."); Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global
Economy, in CHINA'S NEW ROLE, supra note 65, at 7, 11 (describing "a chain-gang
relationship" between China and the United States in light of their growing economic
interdependence); Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, "Chimerica" and the Global Asset
Market Boom, 10 INT'L FIN. 215 (2007) (coining the term "Chimerica"). But see HALPER,
supra, at 216-18 (arguing against elevating the US-China relationship to a special G-2
bilateral partnership). See Generally ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: How CHINA AND
AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD'S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT

(2009) (discussing the intertwined economic relationship between China and the
United States).
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their concurrence there will be neither resolution of the
global imbalances that helped bring on the current crisis
nor lasting reform of the international financial
architecture. 169
In sum, as far as the future goes-whether it relates to the
development of trade relations in the Asia-Pacific region, the
international regulatory environment, or the multilateral
trading system-the TPP negotiations have created more
perplexities than certainty and predictability. Without the
inclusion of China, India, and other fast-growing, emerging
middle-income countries, the agreement is likely to have a
limited impact in the Asia-Pacific region. At this point, it is also
unclear whether the benefits the negotiations provide would
outweigh their exorbitant geopolitical, economic, social,
cultural, and technological costs.
The TPP negotiations greatly deserve continued and more
dedicated attention from policymakers, commentators, and the
public at large, including those from countries not hitherto
involved in the TPP negotiations as well as those located outside
the Asia-Pacific region. As much as we want to know what will be
included in the final text of the TPP Agreement, we also need to
be conscious of what has been excluded from the negotiations
and what such exclusion means for the Asia-Pacific region, the
international regulatory environment, and the multilateral
trading system.

169. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at x-xi.
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